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MODERN MARYLAND CONFLICTS: BACKING INTO 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ONE HAUCH AT A TIME 
Richard W. Bournet 
Despite a Conflicts revolution that has swept through a majority 
of American courts since the 1950s, Maryland has clung steadfastly 
to choice-of-Iaw principles dating back to the early nineteenth cen-
tury. In some ways, Maryland state courts' refusal to adopt the new 
approaches to the choice-of-Iaw process, signaled by the development 
of interest analysis· and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws,2 may seem to simplify the research tasks of Maryland lawyers, 
t Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. For comments and criticisms 
the author is deeply indebted to many friends, particularly Professor William 
L. Reynolds of the University of Maryland Law School and Professor Emeritus 
Eugene J. Davidson of the University of Baltimore Law School, and Claudia 
A. Diamond, a student assistant without whose talent and help this paper 
would be much weaker. These people deserve credit for much of what is good 
in the piece and of course bear no responsibility for the rest. 
I. "Interest analysis" is a method of approaching the choice-of-law process usually 
associated with the writings of the late Brainerd Currie. See BRAINERD CURRIE, 
SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). The chief early judicial 
apostle of interest analysis was Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court who wrote a series of influential opinions that ushered Cali-
fornia away from the traditional formalist mode of analysis toward interest 
analysis in cases such as Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967); Bernkrant 
v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961); and People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 
311 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1957). At the other end of the country, Judge Fuld led the 
Court of Appeals of New York into interest analysis in Babcock v. Jackson, 
191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND 
RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws was published in 
1934 and was largely the work of Professor Joseph Beale, who also put out a 
multivolume treatise, Conflict of Laws, the following year. See RESTATEMENT 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT]; JOSEPH H. 
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). A number of writers, including Walter 
Wheeler Cook, David Cavers, and Ernest Lorenzen, savaged the traditional 
system espoused by Beale. See WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL 
BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); ERNEST G. LORENZEN, SELECTED 
ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947); David F. Cavers, A Critique of 
the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173 (1933). Their early attack 
led the American Law Institute to convene a new study to promulgate a Second 
Restatement in 1953. Other writers jumped into the fray, including Currie, see 
supra note I, Albert Ehrenzweig, see ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962), Robert Leflar, see ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN 
CONFLICTS LAW (1968), Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman, see ARTHUR 
T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 
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because in many instances cases that were good law in the early 
1900s remain good today. Indeed, in the leading case of White v. 
King,3 the Court of Appeals of Maryland grounded its refusal to 
join the developing trend on the belief that adherence to the tradi-
tional system simplified the choice-of-Iaw process, and that adopting 
the new innovations would produce costly and unnecessary litigation 
and breed uncertainty in the law. 4 
Despite White, the lawyer's task in working through a case with 
multistate contacts remains complex in Maryland. The attorney needs 
a "feel" for conflicts doctrine simply to realize that a multistate case 
might implicate foreign law; recognition of this possibility can fre-
quently enable the lawyer to invoke the application of that law. 5 
(1965), and later still others. Those working on the American Law Institute's 
effort to replace the First Restatement went through many drafts before the 
able leadership of Willis Reese finally led to promulgation of an acceptable 
Second Restatement in 1971. 
3. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). 
4. White concerned a personal injury claim by Maryland plaintiffs against a 
Maryland defendant arising from an auto accident in Michigan. Because the 
complaint sounded in simple negligence, the plaintiffs could not prevail if the 
Michigan guest statute applied. The court recognized that the plaintiffs would 
win if it followed Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963), or the 
then-current draft of the Second Restatement, but refused to depart from 
traditional choice-of-law doctrine on grounds of stare decisis and the virtues 
of certainty. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text. 
More recently, in Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 125,453 A.2d 1207, 1210 
(1983), the court of appeals reiterated its adherence to the traditional system 
of lex loci delicti on the basis that it promotes certainty and predictability. 
While the language in Hauch certainly reaffirms the position the court took in 
White, there was evidence in Hauch that the court's devotion to the traditional 
position stood on shakier ground. See infra notes 60-69, 205-09 and accom-
panying text. 
5. Under § 4 of the Maryland Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-504 (1989), a party wishing the court to 
enforce foreign law is required to give adverse parties "reasonable notice ... 
either in the pleadings or by other written notice." [d. As a general matter, 
in the absence of such notice, foreign law is presumed to be the same as the 
law of the forum. See, e.g., Heiserman v. Baltimore & A.R.R., 15 Md. App. 
657, 664 n.2, 292 A.2d 140, 143 n.2 (1972). In a number of cases, the court 
of appeals has upheld trial judges' refusals to apply foreign law because of 
the failure of the parties to give notice under the statute. See, e.g., Gebhard 
v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 128, 252 A.2d 171, 173 (1969); Parkside Terrace 
Apts., Inc. v. Linder, 252 Md. 271, 273-74, 249 A.2d 717, 718 (1969); Hogan 
v. Q.T. Corp., 230 Md. 69, 73-74, 185 A.2d 491, 494 (1962). While the trial 
judge has considerable latitude to allow the issue to be raised belatedly, cf, 
Morris v. Peace, 14 Md. App. 681, 685-86, 288 A.2d 600, 603 (1972) (upholding 
trial judge's discretionary decision to apply Virginia law when notice of intent 
to rely was made one day prior to trial upheld in light of offer to grant 
continuance), and a decision applying foreign law will be upheld if the trial 
judge and all parties assumed its applicability despite failure of anyone formally 
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Further, an understanding of Maryland conflicts law is not likely to 
suffice. This is true for several reasons. The breakdown in the 
national consensus as to which choice-of-law principles should govern 
cases with multistate elements6 and the· increasing isolation of Mary-
land among the ranks of "traditional" jurisdictions adhering to the 
First Restatement,7 creates the real possibility of forum shopping to 
a state whose choice-of-law rules would favor one's client. The rapid 
expansion of courts with judicial jurisdiction in the aftermath of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington8 and its progeny only enlarges 
the opportunities for forum shopping. In order to be a smart shopper 
the attorney needs to become adept at working through the ~onflicts 
to give notice of intention to rely on foreign law, see Joffre v. Canada Dry 
Ginger Ale, 222 Md. I, 5, 158 A.2d 631, 633 (1960), most trial judges rigidly 
enforce the notice statute, and when they do, their decisions are upheld. 
6. In The Choice-oj-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, Patrick Borchers 
suggested that "until the early 196Os, the First Restatement had a nearly 
monolithic following in the United States," Patrick Borchers, The Choice-o/-
Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 359 
(1992), but that today only 15 states subscribe to its tenets, while 24 follow 
the Second Restatement, four apply "interest analysis," and five employ 
Professor Robert Leflar's "choice influencing considerations," id. at 371-73. 
Since the publication of Professor Borchers's article, at least two states, South 
Dakota and Tennessee, have shifted from following the First Restatement to 
following the Second. See Selle v. Pierce, 494 N.W.2d 634 (S.D. 1993); Hataway 
v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992). Clearly the monolith is a thing of 
the past. 
7. The number of states credited with adhering to the principles of the First 
Restatement varies among courts and commentators, but is without much doubt 
low and in a steady state of decline. In discussing the traditional doctrine that 
lex loci delicti applies in torts cases, Judge Rosalyn B. Bell, speaking for the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, recently noted that only twelve American 
jurisdictions adhere to the doctrine, and among these, in the past 10 years, it 
had been reaffirmed by a court of last resort in only seven. Black v. Leath-
erwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md. App. 27, 38-39 n.6, 606 A.2d 295, 300-
01 n.6, cert. denied, 327 Md. 626, 612 A.2d 257 (1992). In his empirical study, 
Professor Borchers acknowledges that different commentators have come up 
with different counts in recent years, ranging from a high of 22 states in 1983 
to a low of 14 in later years. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 367-68 n.87. The 
downward trend continues: of the 15 states Borchers listed, at least two, South 
Dakota and Tennessee, have since left the fold. See supra note 6. 
The court of special appeals recently indicated that, in its view, the First 
Restatement continues to command majority support in contract actions, 
although it conceded that the Second Restatement and other policy-oriented 
approaches are gaining support, and that support for the First Restatement is 
"shrinking." Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 97 Md. App. 
442,455, 630 A.2d 261, 268, cert. granted, 333 Md. 2m, 634 A.2d 62 (1993). 
A close reading of the authority cited in Commercial Union, see id. at 455-
56, 630 A.2d at 268; c/. EUGENE F. SCOLES'& PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 18.21 (2d ed. 1992), fails to support the "majority" characterization, though 
it amply justifies the "shrinking" language. 
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
74 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 23 
doctrines of many states, not just Maryland. Working through this 
conflicts thicket can be a daunting task.9 
This Article argues that Maryland should abandon its adherence 
to the First Restatement and adopt in its stead a more policy-oriented 
approach to choice-of-Iaw problems. The first stage of the argument 
is to demonstrate that Maryland case law itself belies the notion that 
stated adherence to the principles of the traditional system guarantees 
predictability and consistency, and thus, simplification of the task of 
bar and bench in working out conflicts problems within the Maryland 
courts. Second, the Article argues that a number of recent decisions 
in Maryland suggest possible. abandonment of the principles of the 
First Restatement in favor of a more modern policy-oriented ap-
proach. Finally, the Article demonstrates that following these deci-
sions to their logical conclusion would result in a more just and 
rational approach to the choice-of-Iaw process. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO CONFLICTS 
PROBLEMS 
The traditional approach to conflict of laws problems in this 
country reflected formalist and positivist methodologies and values. 
Each state viewed itself as a semi-autonomous sovereign with broad 
authority to create and develop its courts and to adopt substantive 
rules for allocating wealth and power and regulating conduct among 
its people. The earliest influential writers on conflicts, including 
Justice Story, to analogized the American states to sovereign nations 
in Europe and believed that they were largely independent to develop 
substantive rights and obligations, as well as procedures for enforce-
ment of these rights and obligations. As Story put it, every state 
possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its 
own territory. The direct consequence of this rule is, that 
the laws of every state affect, and bind directly all property, 
whether real or personal, within its territory; and all persons, 
who are resident within it, whether natural born subjects, 
or aliens; and also all contracts made, and acts done within 
it .... [A corollary rule] is, that no state ... can, by its 
laws, directly affect, or bind property out of its own terri-
tory, or bind persons not resident therein, whether they are 
9. "The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking 
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize 
about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The 
ordinary court, or a lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it." 
William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
10. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834), was undoubt-
edly the most important nineteenth century American source. 
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natural born subjects, or others .... From these two max-
ims ... there flows a third, and that is, that whatever force 
and obligation the laws of one country have in another, 
depends solely upon the laws, and municipal regulations of 
the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence 
and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent .... 
[Comity of nations] ... is the most appropriate phrase to 
express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of 
the laws of one . . . within the territories of another .11 
75 
The leading American writer on conflict of laws in the early 
twentieth century was Joseph Beale. Beale adhered to Story's terri-
torialist bent, but attempted to rationalize a court's application of 
foreign law, not on the basis of discretionary "comity," but because, 
on principle, there was a duty to recognize rights that had been 
"vested" in the state of their creation. According to Beale, "[a] 
right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of 
its existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done 
cannot be called into question anywhere.' '12 
American courts at the turn of the century alternated between 
the comity and vested rights theories,13 but remained consistently 
wedded to a territorialist system for selecting the normally applicable 
law over a broad range of cases. In most instances, the methodology 
was beguilingly simple. First, the forum's own rules would govern 
all questions of procedure. 14 Second, with respect to nearly every 
category of cases, there was an easy-to-administer rule that pointed 
to a single sovereign as the state whose local law should provide the 
substantive rule of decision. In torts, the rule was lex loci delicti, 
11. [d. §§ 18, 20, 23, 38 (2d ed. 1841). 
12. 3 BEALE, supra note 2, § 73, at 1969. 
13. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (vested 
rights); Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (1892) (comity). 
14. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 585. The introduction to chapter twelve 
of the First Restatement, which deals with questions of procedure, justified 
the automatic lex fori reference for procedural questions on grounds of 
administrability. The introduction recognized that the rule might occasionally 
undermine achievement of the same result in the forum as in the courts of the 
state whose substantive rules governed the case. Professor Beale believed that 
the effect of applying forum procedures would, in most cases, be negligible, 
and in any case was far outweighed by the convenience to the court of being 
able to apply its own rules. See 3 BEALE, supra note 2, § 584.2, at 1601. 
The truth of Beale's belief is questionable. The First Restatement characterized 
a broad range of issues as "procedural." See, e.g., FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 2, § 592 (matters of pleading and proceedings in court); id. § 594 (judge 
or jury trial); id. §§ 595-97 (rules of evidence, including sufficiency, presump-
tions, and admissibility); id. §§ 603-04 (limitations); id. § 606 (limitations on 
damages). 
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the law of the place of the wrong, and that place was usually defined 
as the state in which the right to recovery accrued.l~ In contract 
cases, Beale's rule was lex loci contractus, the law of the place of 
contracting, and this was usually defined as the state in which the 
obligation first became binding. 16 In cases involving inter vivos 
transfer l1 or succession to real property, 18 lex loci rei sitae provided 
the rule of decision. The situs state's law also governed the validity 
of inter vivos transfers of tangible personalty.19 Generally, succession 
to personal property was governed by lex domicilii,20 which also 
tended to control cases involving the personal status of the parties. 21 
By and large, Maryland conflicts doctrine fits neatly into this 
traditional mold. Even when Maryland applies some other state's 
substantive rule, it applies its own procedures.22 On the substantive 
15. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 377; 2 BEALE, supra note 2, §§ 377.2-
378.4. 
16. 2 BEALE, supra note 2, § 311.1, at 1045; FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, 
§§ 311 cmt. d, 332. Justice Story had earlier favored the law of the place of 
performance. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 
242, 280 (8th ed. 1883). Beale acknowledged that the cases speaking of the 
place of the contract often confused the place of making (or lex loci celebra-
tionis) with the place of performance (or lex loci solutionis), 2 BEALE, supra 
note 2, § 311.1, at 1044-45, and that there was a split of authority as to which 
rule to follow, id. § 332.57, at 1171-74, but was clear that the performance 
rule was inferior because it "enable[s] one state to dictate to another what 
acts done in that other's borders shall and what shall not result in a legal 
obligation," id. § 332.3, at 1172-73. 
17. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 215. 
18. [d. §§ 245 (intestacy), 249 (will). 
19. [d. § 257. 
20. [d. §§ 303 (intestacy), 306 (will). 
21. The First Restatement used a domiciliary reference to control jurisdiction to 
grant a divorce, see FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 110-1I, 135, or 
decide custody, see id. § 117, and to provide the governing law regarding 
legitimacy, see id. § 137, adoption, see id. § 142, custody, see id. § 144, or 
guardianship, see id. § 149. The Restatement initially suggested that the validity 
of a marriage turned on the law of the state of celebration, see id. § 121, but 
indicated that the domiciliary state's law could invalidate any marriage con-
tracted elsewhere if it violated the domiciliary state's strong public policies 
against incest, polygamy, or other unions statutorily declared null and, void, 
see id. § 132. 
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 314 Md. 521, 552 A.2d 29 (1989) 
(Maryland applies own statute of limitations to permit time-barred claims 
arising in Illinois between Illinois plaintiffs and Illinois defendant despite the 
fact that the claim was time-barred in state where injury inflicted and discov-
ered); Vernon v. Aubinoe, 259 Md. 159, 269 A.2d 620 (1970) (forum law 
controls as to inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the inferences from it to go to the jury, as well as other procedural 
matters); Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. I, 158 A.2d 631 
(1960) (though law of District of Columbia may govern substantive liability, 
Maryland law governs issues like applicability of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur); 
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side, in tort cases, Maryland applies lex loci delicti,23 which it 
construes as meaning the law of the place where the last event giving 
rise to a right to recovery occurred.24 In contract actions, the place 
of the making of the contract supplies the applicable law.25 Situs law 
governs the inter vivos transfer or succession to real property26 as 
Turner v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 88. Md. App. 1,591 A.2d 886 (1991) 
(tort claim arising in Virginia, though time-barred there, not barred by Mary-
land statute of limitations, which is procedural). 
23. Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123-24,453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1983); Harford 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 248 Md. 669, .673-74, 238 A.2d 115, 117 (1968); 
White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354-55, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966). 
24. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974) 
(in products liability action, law of state of injury, not of design or manufac-
ture, applies); Johnson v. Oroweat Foods, Inc., 785 F.2d 503, 511 (4th Cir. 
1986) (under Maryland law, tortious breach of franchising law governed by 
law of state where injury suffered, not law of state where wrongful act 
occurred); In re Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine Prods. Liab. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 
952, 954 (D. Md. 1991) (law of Maryland, where polio was contracted, governs, 
rather than law of state of manufacture or sale of vaccine); see also infra 
notes 79-86 and accompanying text. 
25. See Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466 (1988) 
(gambling contract enforceable in Maryland because made in state that validates 
such contracts, even though gambling contracts illegal in Maryland); Traylor 
v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 332 A.2d 651 (1975) (law of place of making governs 
validity of liquidated damages clause); Cooper v. Atlantic Fed. Say. & Loan 
Ass'n, 249 Md. 228, 239 A.2d 89 (1968) (law of place of making of contract 
governs whether foreclosure on mortgage extinguishes right to separate 'suit for 
deficiency). Under Maryland law, the contract is considered "made" in the 
place where the last act necessary to complete the contract was performed. 
Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 65-66, 215 A.2d 
467, 471 (1965); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Whittaker M.A. Bioproducts, Inc., 81 
Md. App. 96, 103, 566 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1989). In insurance cases, typically 
the place of making is the state in which the policy is delivered and the 
premiums are paid. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullen, 107 Md. 457, 69 A. 385 
(1908); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v; Porter Hayden Co., 97 Md. App. 442, 
630 A.2d 261, cert. granted, 333 Md. 201,634 A.2d 62 (1993). In Union Trust 
Co. v. Knabe, 122 Md. 584, 89 A. 1106 (1914), a Maryland married woman's 
guaranty of her husband's obligation only became binding upon the making 
of the loan to him, which transpired in New Jersey; therefore, New Jersey law 
applied and rendered unenforceable the obligation she purportedly undertook 
in Maryland. Id. at 606-07, 89 A. at 1114. 
26. Harrison v. Prentice, 183 Md. 474, 38 A.2d 101 (1944) (Maryland statute of 
descent governs intestate succession to the Maryland land of a woman who 
died domiciled in England and permits her estranged British husband to inherit 
share he would not recover under English law or Maryland statute of distri-
bution); Roach v. Jurchak, 182 Md. 646,649, 35 A.2d 817, 819 (1944) ("It is 
a universal principle of the common law that the formalities necessary for 
transfer of real estate, whether inter vivos or testamentary, are governed by 
the lex loci rei sitae, irrespective of the lex domicilii. "); see also Wright v. 
Nugent, 23 Md. App. 337, 328 A.2d 362 (1974), afl'd, 275 Md. 290, 338 A.2d 
898 (1975) (per curiam) (construing statute validating will disposing of Maryland 
property if it conforms to the formality requirements of Maryland, the state 
of domicile of the decedent, or of the state of execution). 
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well as the inter vivos transfer of tangible personal property,27 while 
a domiciliary reference controls succession to a decedent's personal 
property28 as well as determination of a person's status.29 
A. Difficulties in Administering the Traditional System: The 
Fuzzy Line Separating Procedure and Substance 
The traditional system espoused by the First Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws and Maryland's courts appears at first glance to 
be reasonably easy to administer. It is not. Part of the problem 
arises from the difficulties that necessarily accompany characteriza-
tion of legal issues and cases. One example involves the dichotomy 
between procedure, for which the Maryland conflicts rule mandates 
a reference to Maryland law, and substance, for which the conflicts 
rule may point to the law of some other sovereign. An issue repeatedly 
litigated has been whether the measure of damages should be labeled 
"procedural" or "substantive," and despite the traditional view that 
the issue is essentially remedial, Maryland cases have tended to 
characterize damages as presenting a substantive question. 30 Another 
27. ct. United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Contracting Co., 231 Md. 
552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963) (law of situs of property at time of transfer gives 
bailor superior title to bailee's judgment creditors who subsequently removed 
the property to a second state); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-
Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 212 Md. 506, 129 A.2d 815 (1957) (situs 
of check at time of delivery, not making, governs interest of receiver against 
maker). 
28. Persson v. Dukes, 280 Md. 194, 199, 372 A.2d 240, 243 (1977); Smith v. 
Mercantile Trust Co., 199 Md. 264, 86 A.2d 504 (1952). 
29. See, e.g., Milton v. Escue, 201 Md. 190, 93 A.2d 258 (1952) (law of Virginia, 
the domicile of father and child. determines child's legitimacy. and hence his 
ability to inherit Maryland land through intestate succession). Domicile is also 
the basis for subject matter jurisdiction.in divorce cases. Adams v. Adams, 
101 Md. 506. 508-09. 61 A. 628, 629 (1905); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 95 Md. App. 
114, 619 A.2d 561 (1993). As the Fletcher opinion makes clear. once the court 
decides to take divorce jurisdiction. it automatically applies forum law. so the 
domiciliary reference simultaneously controls jurisdiction and choice-of-law 
issues. 
30. See, e.g., Traylor v. Grafton. 273 Md. 649. 332 A.2d 651 (1975) (state of 
making of contract governs validity and enforcement of liquidated damages 
clause in contract); Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp .• 92 Md. App. 
27. 606 A.2d 295 (Maryland cap on damages in tort actions unenforceable in 
suit arising from New Jersey accident. where New Jersey law imposes no such 
limitation). cert. denied. 327 Md. 626. 612 A.2d 257 (1992); Polglase v. 
Greyhound Lines. Inc., 401 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1975) (court upholds 
application of New Jersey rule regarding award of prejudgment interest in 
death actions on basis of substantive characterization of issue). The First 
Restatement and Professor Beale both suggested questions like this were essen-
tially ones of construction of the law of the forum as to whether damages 
issues were procedural or not. See FIRST RESTATEMENT. supra note 2. § 606; 3 
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area of difficulty has involved whether presumptions, inferences, and 
doctrines like res ipsa loquitur should be classified as substantive or 
procedural. 31 Fertile field for disagreement has also involved the 
propriety of characterizing statutes of limitations as procedural or 
substantive.32 
Part of the difficulty is that many rules serve substantive and 
procedural purposes simultaneously, and hence any singular charac-
terization risks being arbitrary. For example, the cases dealing with 
statutes of limitations illustrate how fuzzy the line drawing is and in 
the end suggest that no coherent policy is served by enforcing the 
rigid dichotomy. The courts have divided on the question of whether 
a particular Maryland statute of limitations is substantive or proce-
dural.33 In Feldman v. Granger,34 a case in which the Court of 
BEALE, supra note 2, § 606.1, at 1629-30. The Polglase court purported to 
apply Maryland law, but discussed at length the Second Restatement's char-
acterization of the issue before the court as substantive. See Po/glase, 401 F. 
Supp. at 336 (discussing SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 171 cmt. c). 
Polglase noted that, under the Second Restatement's analysis, the issue would 
be deemed substantive if the rule were perceived to be related to proper 
assessment of the basic damages ensuing from the tort, but procedural; and 
hence subject to forum law, if perceived as a remedy for a second wrong, i.e., 
wrongful delay in payment. [d. at 336. 
31. See, e.g., Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. I, 158 A.2d 631 
(1960) (applying "procedural" label to applicability of res ipsa doctrine). 
32. The general view in Maryland is that most statutes of limitations are procedural, 
and thus require only a reference to forum law. See, e.g., Doughty v. Pret-
tyman, 219 Md. 83, 88, 148 A.2d 438, 440 (1959) (citing FIRST RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 2, § 604); Turner v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 88 Md; App. I, 3, 591 
A.2d 886, 887 (1991). However, if compliance with the statute is seen as a 
condition precedent to the right of action, the statute will receive a substantive 
characterization. See Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 
(1975) (Maryland statute of limitations in death actions goes to right, not 
remedy, and hence statutory extension cannot be applied retroactively to death 
antedating extension), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976); Turner, 88 Md. App. 
at 3, 591 A.2d at 887. Moreover, if the limitations period is viewed as a grant 
of immunity from suit it will be classified as substantive. See Pottratz v. Davis, 
588 F. Supp. 949, 952-53 (D. Md. 1984) (Oregon limitations on products 
liability claims to injuries sustained within eight years after product purchased 
held substantive); President of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F. Supp. 
557, 571-73 (D. Md. 1980), a/I'd in part, dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th 
Cir. 1981) (limitation on right to sue architects, engineers and contractors more 
than ten years after substantial completion of structure held substantive), afj'd 
in part, dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1981). 
33. Compare Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 368, 216 A.2d 723, 726-27 
(1966) (Maryland's six-month statute of limitations on suits against represen-
tatives of estates serves substantive ends of foreclosing claims so stale as to be 
unjust and of encouraging prompt settlement of estates) with Martel v. Stafford, 
992 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.1O (1st Cir. 1993) (same statute characterized as pro-
cedural). 
34. 255 Md. 288, 257 A.2d 421 (1969). 
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Appeals of Maryland decided to extend the discovery rule to all 
professional malpractice actions, the court quoted a law review article 
pointing out that 
[t]he primary consideration underlying [statutes of limita-
tions] is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant. There 
comes a time when he ought to be secure in his reasonable 
expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient 
obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a 
claim when 'evidence has been lost, memories have faded, 
and witnesses have disappeared. '35 
The protection of a defendant from "stale claims," to the extent it 
serves the interest of repose, is properly characterized as a substantive 
purpose of the law. Yet, as Feldman illustrates, its "fairness" can 
be counterbalanced by the desire to afford the plaintiff who exercises 
"reasonable diligence the full benefit of the statutory period, "36 a 
desire that seems both procedural and substantive. 
The tests Maryland developed to distinguish between procedural 
and substantive statutes of limitations do not seem related to any 
discernable policy or purpose. The rule seems to be that statutes of 
limitations are presumptively procedural unless the statute is con-
strued to be a condition precedent to the right of action or to create 
an immunity to suit.J7 But the Maryland cases are not clear even as 
to whose law should be applied to determine the purpose of the 
statute.38 
35. [d. at 297, 257 A.2d at 426 (quoting Developments in the Law-Statutes 0/ 
Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950». 
36. Feldman, 255 Md. at 297, 257 A.2d at 426. In Pottratz, the court characterized 
Oregon's requirement that injury occur within eight years of the sale of the 
putatively defective product in product liability actions as substantive because 
it was designed to serve the purpose of repose; but its explanation of why this 
was so seemed to mix arguably procedural concerns about access to reliable 
proof after a lapse of time with substantive concerns regarding the ability of 
people to "plan their affairs with certainty, free from the disruptive burden 
of protracted and unknown potential liability. " Pottratz; 588 F. Supp. at 952. 
37. See cases cited supra note 32. 
38. A federal case, Rockstroh v. A.H. Robins Co., 602 F. Supp. 1259 (D. Md. 
1985), suggests that the Maryland view is that the characterization the foreign 
state gives its own statute of limitations should not be dispositive. Not cited 
by Rockstroh is an opinion by Judge Harvey that takes a directly opposing 
view. See Leonard v. Wharton, 268 F. Supp. 715, 718-19 (D. Md. 1967) 
("Whether or not a statute of limitations merely bars the remedy or actually 
extinguishes the right of action depends upon the statute's construction by the 
courts of the enacting jurisdiction."), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1969). 
Rockstroh cites no authority for its position except two other federal diversity 
cases applying Maryland conflicts doctrine. See Rockstroh, 602 F. Supp. at 
1263 (citing Pottratz, 588 F. Supp. at 952; President 0/ Georgetown College 
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Indeed, Maryland's courts have failed to come up with a rational 
test for analyzing cases on the borderline between substance and 
procedure. In Jacobs v. Adams,39 the court of special appeals tried. 
It was faced with the question of whether to enforce the law of the 
District of Columbia, which barred negligence suits covered by that 
jurisdiction's no-fault law, or Maryland's rule, which permitted the 
plaintiff to pursue traditional remedies even though optional recovery 
under the state's no-fault legislation was available. The accident 
occurred in the District, and the court characterized the issue as 
substantive and hence declined to enforce Maryland's rule. The court 
refused to characterize the issue as procedural, stating that "[t]here 
is no reason to classify an issue as procedural, and hence controlled 
by the law of the forum, unless it affects the manner in which the 
forum administers justice."4O With all respect to the Jacobs court, 
v. Madden, 505 F. Supp. 557, 571 (D. Md. 1980), a/I'd in part, dismissed in 
part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1981). The Pottratz and Georgetown College cases 
are discussed supra note 32. Neither Pottratz nor Georgetown College stands 
for the view Rockstroh attributes to them. Each noted that Maryland had 
construed its statute of limitations on the particular issue at hand to create a 
substantive immunity, but then went on to expressly rely upon the judicial 
construction that the courts of the foreign states in question gave their own 
limitations statutes. See Pottratz, 588 F. Supp. at 952-53; Georgetown College, 
505 F. Supp. at 571-73. 
In upholding the power of a state to apply its own statute of limitations to 
a foreign claim to which it could not apply its substantive law under Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), the Supreme Court was careful 
to limit its holding to those cases where the statutes of limitation of the states 
whose substantive law applied were admittedly procedural under their own 
definitions. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729-30 n.3 (1988) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Of course, the 
foreign characterization may not have been made for conflicts of law purposes. 
Still, Sun Oil's limitation may mean that there is some outer limit to the power 
of a state to characterize .the statute of limitations issue as procedural and then 
apply lex fori. 
39. 66 Md. App. 779, 505 A.2d 930, cert. denied, 306 Md. 513, 510 A.2d 260 
(1986). 
40. [d. at 791, 505 A.2d at 936. The quoted language is the court's paraphrase of 
a suggestion by Professors William Richman and William Reynolds that interest 
analysis should influence the characterization of issues as procedural or sub-
stantive. The suggestion is made in the writers' book, Understanding Conflict 
0/ Laws, that "if neither the forum's interest nor judicial convenience is 
involved, no reason exists to treat the problem as 'procedural. '" WILLIAM M. 
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46, 
at 116 (1984). This statement is also quoted in Jacobs. See Jacobs, 66 Md. 
App. at 791, 505 A.2d at 936 (1986). 
Maryland's cases certainly do not reflect the kind of interest analysis 
suggested by Richman and Reynolds. There is substantial authority that Mar-
yland would toll the running of its statute of limitations because of the absence 
of the defendant from the state despite the fact that the defendant and the 
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its own test is no test at all: Cases involving issues such as the 
measure of damages or the statute of limitations invariably "affect 
the manner in which the forum administers justice," yet only some 
of them end up being classified as procedural. 
plaintiff had been nonresidents of the state and the cause of action was foreign. 
See, e.g., Osborn v. Swetnam, 221 Md. 216, 156 A.2d 654 (1959); Miles v. 
McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603, 604 (D. Md. 1933); Mason v. Union Mills, 81 Md. 
446, 32 A. 311 (1895). In Rockstroh v. A.H. Robins Co., 602 F. Supp. 1259 
(D. Md. 1985), the court, applying what it viewed to be modern Maryland 
conflicts doctrine, allowed plaintiff to proceed on a Florida action against a 
foreign defendant, despite the fact that the claim would have been time-barred 
under Florida law withou~ any explanation as to why it served Maryland's 
interest to do so. It is possible, of course, that plaintiff was a Marylander, 
and hence an intended beneficiary of the longer Maryland statute, but the case 
report does not reflect any inquiry at all into her status or Maryland's interest. 
Nor, under the Maryland cases, should it have. In Johnson v. G.D. Searle 
& Co., 314 Md. 521, 552 A.2d 29 (1989), two Illinois women brought products 
liability claims in Maryland against an Illinois pharmaceutical company for 
injuries sustained in Illinois through insertion of intrauterine devices there. The 
reason the women sued in. Maryland was because their claim was time-barred 
by Illinois law, and they wished to take advantage of Maryland's longer statute 
of limitations. The court had no difficulty with Maryland's entertaining the 
suit, and refused defendant's request for a forum non conveniens dismissal 
because the Illinois courts were closed. In the court's view, the fact that the 
plaintiffs had two years after discovery of their injuries to sue in Illinois was 
beside the point. Johnson deals directly with the forum non conveniens issue, 
not the choice-of-Iaw issue, but it is implicit authority for rejecting the view 
taken by Professors Richman and Reynolds. Even though hearing the case 
advanced no Maryland interest, rewarded the plaintiffs' forum shopping, and 
contributed to the cluttering of Maryland's courts, the court felt bound to 
allow the case to go forward under Maryland's "procedural" statute of 
limitations. 
There is language in Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 133 n.lO, 453 A.2d 
1207, 1214 n.lO (1983), suggesting that Maryland tends to apply lex fori in all 
statute of limitations cases, not so much because the issue is procedural as 
because it implicates important public policies of the forum. The case quotes 
Professor Leflar as permitting a state to bar foreign claims on the same basis 
as it bars domestic ones; i.e., that doing so advances "certain social policies" 
of the forum. See id. (quoting ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 
§ 127, at 253 (3d ed. 1977». Neither Hauch nor Leflar explain precisely what 
these policies are, why they deserve to be applied to foreign claims, or why 
they are strong. Unless tails are truly meant to wag dogs, it would be bizarre 
for Hauch to imply that aI/ rules that determine whether relief can be granted 
are procedural and hence require a lex fori reference. Whatever the court 
meant, it was certainly not speaking the same language as Professors Richman 
and Reynolds. See discussion supra. (In fairness, it is hard to attach great 
significance to the Hauch suggestion that the procedural characterization be 
abandoned or that Maryland limitations rules represent strong public policies 
of the state regarding foreclosing stale claims, because subsequent Maryland 
cases have not repeated it or even referred to it.) 
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B. Further Difficulties: Fitting Cases into Substantive Categories 
The courts have also had difficulty giving proper substantive 
characterization to claims so as to determine the applicable law. 
Sometimes a decision simply adopts one characterization rather than 
another without any principled explanation why the characterization 
is correct. One example is Satellite Financial Planning v. First Na-
tional Bank,41 a federal action against satellite sellers brought by 
Maryland plaintiffs who wished to set up a business to help Maryland 
purchasers of satellite dishes finance their purchases. Some of the 
claims were federal, but a number arose under state law, including 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference 
with business relations, trade defamation, and common law fraud. 
The contract contained an "operating agreement" indicating it was 
to be "construed under Delaware law." The court indicated that all 
tort claims would be governed by Maryland law because that was 
where all of the wrongdoing had occurred; but the court found, 
without explanation, the fiduciary duty claims presumptively con-
tractual. 42 
Another example is Milton v. Escue,43 where a thirty-year-old 
woman from Virginia laid claim to being the legitimate daughter of 
a Virginia decedent and hence entitled to his estate to the exclusion 
of his four surviving siblings. Though seeking only a declaratory 
judgment in Maryland's courts, the case report makes it obvious that 
the woman was attempting to lay the groundwork for claiming title 
to land situated in Maryland.44 In upholding her position that the 
case involved status, governed by the law of her domicile, and not 
succession to land, governed by Maryland law, the court focused on 
language in Beale's treatise45 that relies heavily upon an earlier 
41. 633 F. Supp. 386 (D. Del. 1986). 
42. [d. at 393; cf. President of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F. Supp. 557 
(D. Md. 1980), afl'd in part, dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1981), 
where Georgetown sought to avoid a statutory limitation on its right to sue 
architects in tort for negligent design of one of its buildings by attempting to 
get the court to characterize the claim "as one for negligent breach of contract 
and thus 'based on a contract' and outside the scope" of the statute. [d. at 
577 n.37. The court quite sensibly rejected the argument. Quoting from 
Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969), the 
court said that professional malpractice actions, whether sounding in tort or 
contract, "share the common gravamen of negligence," and hence should 
receive the same treatment in terms of statutes of limitations. Georgetown 
College, 505 F. Supp. at 577 (quoting Mumford, 254 Md. at 714, 255 A.2d at 
367). 
43. 201 Md. 190, 93 A.2d 258 (1952). 
44. See id. at 204, 93 A.2d at 265. 
45. 2 BEALE, supra note 2, § 140.2, at 712. 
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Maryland case,46 which the Milton court conceded was misstated by 
Beale.47 
Milton should be compared to Harford Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Bruchey,48 an action involving a claim for loss of consortium filed 
by a Maryland husband against a Virginia driver and the Maryland 
lessor of the driver's automobile. The accident arose from a head-
on collision in Virginia between the plaintiffs' vehicle and that of 
the defendants. Under Virginia law, unlike Maryland law, relief for 
loss of consortium was unavailable to the husband. The trial judge 
characterized the issue as involving "conjugal rights and duties ... 
which should be governed by the law of the marital domicile. "49 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, treating the issue as a simple 
matter of tort not implicating any strong Maryland public policies 
and simply warranting enforcement of lex loci delictL50 
The distinction between transactions affecting land, which receive 
a situs reference, and those affecting contracts or succession to 
personalty has also caused difficulty. The court of appeals has hinted 
that contracts affecting land would be regulated by the law of the 
state where the contract is made, not by the law of the state where 
the land is situated, but the court has not finally determined the 
matter. 51 Doctrines promoting party autonomy have been employed 
in such a way as to blur the distinction. 52 
New legal claims and theories create problems of characterization 
that have required judicial intervention and narrow line drawing that 
have given litigants, and sometimes courts, difficulty. The cases teach 
that statutory rules fixing no-fault liability deserve a tort character-
46. Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 151 Md. 321, 134 A. 497 (1926). 
47. The Milton court noted that Beale cited Holloway for the position that 
legitimacy should be decided according to a domiciliary and not situs reference, 
despite the fact that the court itself found Holloway "not entirely clear" on 
the question. See Milton, 201 Md. at 204, 93 A.2d at 265. 
48. 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (1968). 
49. [d. at 672-73,238 A.2d at 117. 
50. [d. at 673-74, 238 A.2d at 117-18; accord Rhee v. Combined Enters., Inc., 74 
Md. App. 214, 536 A.2d 1197, cert. dismissed, 314 Md. 123, 549 A.2d 385 
(1988). 
51. See Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 660-61, 332 A.2d 651, 659-60 (1975) 
(noting the problem and applying both forum (place of making) law and 
foreign (situs) law validating liquidated damages clause in contract for sale of 
realty); cj. Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30,. 415 A.2d 1096 (1980) (in 
foreclosure action on Maryland realty by New York creditor claiming defendant 
dishonored New York debt, Maryland law validating contract held applicable 
against usury defense on basis of party autonomy evidenced by choice-of-law 
provision in contract). 
52. See, e.g., Harrison v. Prentice, 183 Md. 474, 38 A.2d 101 (1944) (applying 
doctrine of equitable conversion to render will of Maryland land subject to 
English statute of distribution because English testatrix directed sale of land 
and distribution of proceeds); cj. Kronovet, 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 
(upholding real estate mortgage against usury defense and allowing foreclosure 
because of choice-of-law provision in contract). 
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ization,53 but that the benefits victims receive from suits for enforce-
ment of uninsured motorist coverage and personal injury protection 
(PIP) benefit clauses in insurance contracts warrant contract treat-
ment.54 
Proper characterization of products liability claims has proven 
particularly vexing. It appears that the theory of a plaintiff's pleading 
determines what substantive rule will be applied; thus, a plaintiff 
unschooled in the law of products liability is well advised to plead 
as many theories as she has and hope at least one of them provides 
her with a favorable choice-of-Iaw. This was not always true. After 
reading leading texts and early Maryland cases suggesting recognition 
that implied warranty claims for tortious injury more closely fit into 
tort than contract law, Judge Miller, sitting in diversity, pre9icted 
that Maryland would characterize those claims as torts for choice-
of-law purposes, and hence applied lex loci delicti rather than the 
law of the place of sale or delivery of the offending product. 55 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland subsequently rejected Judge Miller's 
view, holding that in products liability actions, negligence counts 
warrant a tort "place-of-the-wrong" reference, but that warranty 
counts should receive a contractual "place-of-making" reference. 56 
53. Jacobs v. Adams, 66 Md. App. 779, 505 A.2d 930, cert. denied, 306 Md. 513, 
510 A.2d 259 (1986). 
54. See Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 328 Md. 240, 614 A.2d 85 
(1992) (PIP); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wendler, 796 F. Supp. 201 (D. 
Md. 1992) (uninsured motorist coverage). 
55. See Uppegren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709,714-16 (D. 
Md. 1971), and authorities cited therein. Judge Miller was so sure of himself 
that he disregarded the position of counsel for both parties that he should 
apply contract conflict rules. Id. at 714. 
56. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976) 
(applying Maryland law imposing secondary impact liability for design defect 
because car sold in Maryland, even though accident occurred in North Caro-
lina); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 
(1974) (applying Maryland tort law creating secondary impact liability for 
design defect because accident occurred in Maryland, even though law of place 
of sale, Alabama, created no such liability). 
Frericks and Volkswagen have the salutary effect of enhancing the chances 
of a claimant's victory in products liability actions, but the court's failure to 
articulate any principled justification for the bifurcated treatment of implied 
warranty and tort theories has left the Maryland courts free to continue the 
debate in other contexts. See, e.g., Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 
110, 120-21, 422 A.2d 16, 23 (1980) (despite Frericks and Volkswagen, Judge 
Miller was correct in concluding that '''warranty is a matter of tort as well as 
contract,''' and hence, "[f]or the purposes of the Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act, we conclude that appellant's suit for breach of implied 
warranty can be a 'claim in tort' which allows appellant to claim the role of 
an injured person under the Act," possibly escaping the effect of the common-
law rule that release of one tort feasor releases all). 
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Most of the substantive classification of cases for choice-of-Iaw 
purposes have involved nearly intuitive judgments unsupported by 
any clear reasoning. Without such reasoning, they often appear 
arbitrary. For example, each of the cases set out in this section had 
at least two substantive category faces, and many could as easily 
have been identified with one category as with the other. Only 
occasionally do the cases acknowledge the arbitrary nature of their 
decisionsY In Johnson v. Oroweat Foods, Inc., 58 the Fourth Circuit 
entertained a diversity claim by a Maryland plaintiff against a Con-
necticut bakery for breach of contract and violation of the Connec-
ticut Franchise Act. The plaintiff had contracted for an exclusive 
distributorship for Prince George's County and the District of Co-
lumbia and claimed that his rights were violated by the defendant. 
The question arose whether the Connecticut Franchise Act could be 
applied to his case. The court was troubled by the problem: 
It is not obvious . . . that the Connecticut Act does not 
apply . . . . The Maryland rule for torts would seem to be 
applicable here, because what is alleged-a violation of a 
statute-is essentially a matter of tort and not of contract. 
Under that rule, the law of the place of injury applies. The 
place of injury is the place where the injury was suffered, 
not where the wrongful act took place. Because the injury 
57. Indeed, sometimes courts simply glide over the problem. For example, in Jiffy 
Lube Int'l, Inc. v. Morgan, No. 92-1249, 1993 WL 366330 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 
1993) (unpublished) (disposition noted at 7 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 1993», the 
Fourth Circuit considered a diversity action by Jiffy Lube against mUltiple 
,defendants who had purchased the right to develop Jiffy Lube franchises in 
several South Pacific countries. When the defendants defaulted on their note, 
the plaintiff sued. The defendants challenged the validity of the contract on 
several grounds, including usury and fraud in the inducement, and counter-
claimed in tort for misrepresentation. [d. at "2. Applying Maryland conflicts 
doctrine, the court held that California law, not Maryland law, should be 
applied because the contract, though negotiated both in Maryland and Cali-
fornia, was finally executed and rendered enforceable in the latter state. [d. at 
*3. The court ignored the fact that one of the defendants signed the note in 
Hawaii and concentrated on the fact that the other two signed in California. 
[d. at *1, *3. Finding that the interest on the note violated California's usury 
statute, the court ordered the case remanded for recalculation of the interest 
at a legally enforceable rate. [d. at *3-*4. The court found that the fraud 
defense failed because under California law the plaintiff had at most been 
guilty of '''dealer['] puff," and in any event there was insufficient evidence of 
reasonable reliance. [d. at *4. In this regard, the court never seemed to consider 
whether the issue of fraud should be decided as a contract problem and hence 
under lex loci contractus, warranted consideration as a tort under lex loci 
delicti, or should be characterized as contractual when considered as a defense 
and as a tort when considered as a claim. 
58. 785 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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here was suffered in Maryland, it appears possible . . . that 
the Connecticut Act may not apply to Johnson's termina-
tion. On the other hand, Johnson urges that the statutory 
violation is ancillary to the contract claim, and that, because 
Connecticut law governs question of liability for breach of 
contract, the termination of his wholesale dealership is also 
subject to the Connecticut statute. 59 
87 
The difficulty of the problem is compounded by the fact that 
the result of a categorization one way or the other can lead to 
untoward results. The products liability cases described above-
characterizing negligence, and presumably strict liability, claims as 
torts, but products liability claims as contracts-have the singular 
virtue of assuring the plaintiff the opportunity to get the court to 
apply at least one plaintiff-oriented rule whenever the substantive 
rules of the two jurisdictions differ and the place of contracting is 
different from the place of injury. But the cases' virtue may also be 
seen, at least by those who wish predictability and certainty for 
defendants, as a vice. Moreover, in those cases where the plaintiff 
is likely to pursue both theories-as she is likely to do if neither is 
overwhelmingly preferable to her-they also create the possibility of 
complex actions likely to confuse juries made up of the best and the 
brightest our system of justice can muster. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Hauch v. Connor,6() gave 
indirect recognition to the difficulties of the traditional methodology 
requirement that all claims be fitted into clear-cut categories. Hauch 
involved an auto accident in Delaware in which two Maryland 
employees of a Maryland employer were injured, allegedly through 
the negligence of the driver of their vehicle, a Maryland co-employee. 
When the two victims sued their co-employee in a Maryland court, 
the co-employee defended on the basis that the Delaware worker's 
compensation statute barred their claims and remitted them to stat-
utory benefits. The plaintiffs contended that Maryland's worker's 
compensation statute applied, because all claims arose out of em-
ployment relationships grounded on Maryland employment contracts. 
Thus, the plaintiffs argued that Maryland's worker's compensation 
statute did not bar their claims against the co-employee. The Mary-
land circuit court treated the issue as one of tort law and applied 
Delaware law. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed 
on the ground that the Delaware rule could not be applied because 
it infringed upon the strong public policy of Maryland. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the plaintiffs 
defended the court of special appeals' decision by arguing abandon-
59. Id. at 510-11 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
60. 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). 
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ment of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti in favor of a more 
flexible law of the state of the most significant contacts test under 
the Second Restatement. The court rejected the invitation to jettison 
the First Restatement on stare decisis grounds, and because it felt 
the First Restatement's position promoted predictability and cer-
tainty.61 The court noted that a conflict had arisen among American 
states as to whether to characterize worker's compensation claims as 
involving tort law or contract law principles, with the result that 
some courts had applied lex loci delicti while others applied lex loci 
contractus to such claims. The court noted that this conflict had 
largely been resolved by statutory directives regarding choice-of-Iaw 
in the worker's compensation statutes themselves, but the statutory 
directives often did not cover worker's compensation statute bars 
against third-party tort actions. 62 
In Hauch, the Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to follow 
either the tort or contract characterization for the case before it.63 
Instead, the court treated the case as fitting within a new classifica-
tion, "worker's compensation" cases. The new classification was not 
derived from the Maryland worker's compensation statute, which did 
not treat co-employee suits, but from the Delaware statute, which 
did so by barring them. 64 The court's disingenuous employment of 
foreign law to characterize the case before it was the result of the 
court's perception of Maryland's policy interests. As the court said, 
it wished to "recognize that workmen's compensation law conflict 
issues present distinct policy questions and should not be treated as 
tort or contract matters for choice of law purposes. "65 In actions 
against the employers themselves, Hauch indicated that all courts 
should apply the exclusive remedy rule of any state in which the 
employer may be held liable for worker's compensation benefits on 
the ground that to do otherwise would upset the system of predictable 
insurability the compensation system had attempted to create by 
simultaneously creating liability without fault and immunity from 
negligence damages.66 But this rationale should not be applied to co-
employee suits. Here the rule should be that lex fori governs, because 
Maryland has strong public policy concerns when the accident occurs 
within the state but the employment relationship arises elsewhere,67 
and the state's interests are stronger when the accident occurs outside 
61. [d. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210. 
62. [d. at 127, 453 A.2d at 1211. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. at 133-34, 453 A.2d at 1214. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
67. This had occurred in Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969), a 
case strongly relied upon by the Hauch court. 
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it but involves an employment relationship created in Maryland and 
parties domiciled in Maryland. 68 
In the face of dysfunctional effects of the classification choices 
available under the traditional system, the Hauch court basically 
created a new classification, co-employee suits, for which it formu-
lated a new rule, lex fori. This allowed it to keep intact the form of 
the traditional system, while escaping its results through the devel-
opment of a new case category that could be used to advance the 
interests in promoting recovery policies that Maryland's laws of tort 
and worker's compensation were both designed to foster. 69 
c. . Further Difficulties: Locating the Proper Reference Point on a 
Map 
The methodology of the First Restatement is supposed to be 
simple because characterizations are intuitively easy to make, and 
once made, involve rules that are clear and unambiguous. As indi-
cated above, the characterizations are not easy to rationalize. But 
assuming one has properly classified the problem, there remains the 
question of whether the rule associated wiih it can easily be applied. 
The Maryland cases suggest the answer is often "No." 
In complex commercial transactions, the place of the making of 
a contract is not always a simple matter. While courts in Maryland 
apply the law of the place where the last act making the contract 
binding occurred, that place is not always self-evident.70 
68. Comparing the Hutzell facts with those before it, the Hauch court found that 
"[iJn the instant case, although the injury did not occur in Maryland, there 
are greater Maryland interests." Hauch, 295 Md. at 133, 453 A.2d at 1214. 
69. This new category has required subsequent development. See Bishop v. Twiford, 
317 Md. 170, 562 A.2d 1238 (1989), discussed infra at notes 210-14. 
70. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 97 Md. App. 
442, 630 A.2d 261 (insurance contracts are generally considered made where 
policy is delivered and premium is delivered; but when this occurs through a 
broker, place of making turns on whether broker is insured's agent, in which 
case delivery to the broker completes the contract, or is agent for the insurer 
to deliver the policy to the insured, in which case delivery only occurs when 
policy reaches insured), cert. granted, 333 Md. 201, 634 A.2d 261 (1993); see 
also Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 511 n.7 (4th Cir. 1986); 
Union Trust Co. v. Knabe, 122 Md. 584,606-07, 89 A. 1106, 1114-15 (1914); 
MalIinckdrodt v. Whittaker M.A. Bioproducts, Inc., 81 Md. App. 96, 103, 
566 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1989). In Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc. v. Morgan, No. 92-1249, 
1993 WL 366330 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 1993) (unpublished) (disposition noted at 
7 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 1993», the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, had 
particular difficulty figuring out where the note sued on became enforceable. 
The contract was originally negotiated over the telephone between a seller 
operating in Maryland and California purchasers. It is unclear from the opinion 
where the original contract was executed, but the deal was renegotiated with 
one additional purchaser and required the issuance of a new promissory note. 
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One might think the difficulty of finding the contact point would 
not appear in tort actions, where the courts apply the last event 
giving rise to the right of action test to determine the locus delicti. 
This is not the case. In the first place, some torts not involving 
palpable physical injury are difficult to localize. In Rein v. Koons 
Ford, Inc., 71 for example, a Maryland purchaser sued a Virginia 
automobile dealer from whom he bought a car under the Virginia 
consumer protection statute.72 Perusal of Judge Rodowsky's opinion 
fails to clarify whether the wrong occurred with the multistate pub-
lication of the defendant's false advertisement in the Washington 
Post newspaper, 73 or when the plaintiff purchased the car in Virginia, 
or when the plaintiff was attracted to come to Virginia by reading 
the advertisement.74 It is difficult to understand upon what principle 
Judge Rodowsky would discern whether injury was inflicted upon 
arrival in Virginia rather than upon departure from Maryland, where 
the plaintiff may have read the offending advertisement. 75 
The seller drafted and mailed the note to the purchasers; one of them signed 
it in Hawaii and the others signed it in California, whence it was mailed back 
to the seller's Maryland headquarters. [d. at *1. The seller argued that Maryland 
was the place of execution because the new note did not become enforceable 
until the seller accepted it in Maryland by canceling the old note there. [d. at 
*3. The purchasers argued that California law applied because the acceptance 
was complete when the contract was executed there and posted back toward 
Maryland. [d. 
71. 318 Md. 130, 567 A.2d 101 (1989). 
72. [d. at 131, 567 A.2d at 102. 
73. See id. at 146, 567 A.2d at 108 (noting that the advertisement was circulated 
throughout the Washington metropolitan area, including suburban communities 
in Maryland and Virginia). 
74. The complaint in the action failed to state where Rein read the allegedly false 
advertisement. [d. at 134, 567 A.2d at 102. The court seems at one moment 
to view the wrong as occurring when Rein purchased the car in Virginia: 
In the contract formed there, Koons included the document prepara· 
tion charge in that section of the written contract dealing with taxes 
and tags. It is Rein's position that the . .. fee, in relation to the 
advertisement, is an increase in the cash price. By . . . purchasing 
automobiles under contracts which included the document preparation 
charge, Rein . . . suffered harm which the statute . . . intended to 
prevent. 
[d. at 145, 567 A.2d at 108. Yet, in the same breath, the court also spoke of 
the advertisements that drew Rein to the Virginia showroom: 
[d. 
By going to Falls Church in response to the ads and there purchasing 
automobiles ... Rein and others have suffered harm ... the statute 
... intended to prevent. To the extent that the "loss" provision in 
the statute requires a monetary detriment, that requirement is satisfied 
by the unquantified expense of traveling to Falls Church in response 
to the ... deceptive ad. 
75. See also Korotki v. Goughan, 597 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Md. 1984). In Korolki, 
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In wrongful death cases Maryland follows the rule that the state 
of injury, not the state of death, supplies the rule of decision. 76 The 
state of injury is not always easy to ascertain, however, even in 
personal injury cases. Especially difficult are those cases where the 
state of the wrongful conduct is known, but injury could have been 
inflicted in two or more jurisdictions. This occurred in Bledsoe v. 
Crowley,77 a District of Columbia Circuit diversity case in which the 
plaintiff suffered permanent injury as a result of the development of 
a brain tumor that proper diagnosis and treatment would have 
discovered and prevented. The court was concerned about where the 
plaintiff had suffered his injuries. The plaintiff's treatment was in 
Maryland, but the court understood that this was not conclusive 
regarding where he had been harmed; with regard to that question, 
the court said his injury may as well have occurred in Maryland, 
where he had worked, as in the District of Columbia, where he 
resided during most of the period of his treatment. 78 
Sacra v. Sacra,79 a Court of Special Appeals of Maryland case, 
is equally ambiguous regarding where injury was inflicted, though 
the ambiguity is restricted to a much narrower range of space and 
time. In Sacra, a passenger was killed when the camper vehicle in 
which he was riding exploded after being struck by another vehicle 
because the camper's driver had failed to obey a stop sign.80 The 
camper driver's negligence and the initial impact with the second 
vehicle occurred in Delaware, but the crash caused the camper to be 
pushed across the Maryland-Delaware state line into Maryland, where 
it ran into a utility pole, overturned, and exploded into flames. 81 
Whether the plaintiff's decedent suffered any injury in Delaware is 
unclear from the report; there is no question that his most serious 
injuries, and his death, occurred in Maryland. 
In the view of the Sacra court, White v. King82 required an 
application of the law of the state where the tort occurred, regardless 
the district court considered a federal suit against Delaware officials who 
allegedly wrongfully pursued a Maryland resident from Delaware into Mary-
land, arrested him, coerced him to return to Delaware, and caused suspension 
of his driver's license, thus depriving him of his civil rights in violation of 
both federal and state law. The federal court noted Maryland's adherence to 
lex loci delicti in order to promote predictability and certainty, and then wryly 
pointed out that a jury had to be asked where the wrong occurred. See id. at 
1379, 1379 nn.49, 51. 
76. See Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp. 671, 674 (D. Md. 1967). 
77. 849 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
78. [d. at 642 n.4. 
79. 48 Md. App. 163, 426 A.2d 7 (1981). 
80. [d. at 164, 426 A.2d at .8. 
81. [d. 
82. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). 
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of the domicile of the parties, and thus the sole question was where 
the tort did OCCUr.83 It is not clear from the report in Sacra whether 
the court applied Maryland's "last event" test84 for defining the 
place of the wrong: At one point the opinion seemed to criticize the 
defendant for "suggest[ing] that there are two separate and distinct 
elements of the accident in question ... where the alleged wrongful 
act ... took place and ... where the injury or death was inflicted"8S 
but only a few lines later indicated that "the harm" had occurred 
in Delaware. 86 
Sacra demonstrates weaknesses of the First Restatement meth-
odology.87 In the end, in order to apply the law of the place of the 
tort, the court felt it had to figure out intuitively where the tort 
happened. The court at first seemed to look at the facts, decided 
that somehow the center of gravity of the accident involved Delaware 
facts, and labeled the case a Delaware tort. No explanation for why 
this intuitive judgment was correct was offered, except to point out 
that the accident would not have happened but for the running of 
the stop sign in Delaware. But this would make it appropriate to 
treat the first event leading to a claim as the place of the wrong-
an approach that is clearly not ·the law of Maryland.88 It is possible 
to speculate that some injury was sustained in Delaware, at the point 
of initial contact with the other vehicle, and that the plaintiff's 
decedent thus did not suffer his first injury when the vehicle hit the 
pole in Maryland. If it were true he was hurt, however little, in 
83. Id. at 352, 233 A.2d at 765. 
84. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
85. Sacra, 48 Md. App. at 166, 426 A.2d at 9. 
86. Id. at 167, 426 A.2d at 9. It is unclear what the court meant by "harm." It 
could have meant "initial injury," which would make the decision consistent 
with the "last event" test, or it could have meant simply the point at which 
the events the court felt were crucial to the ultimate injury occurred. According 
to the court, 
there was a single, integrated accident, which occurred in Delaware 
and caused the death of the appellant's decedent. The fact that the 
state line intervened between the impact and death was merely a 
fortuitous situation. . . . [T]here was no substantial lapse of time or 
distance between the original impact and the resultant death of the 
victim. Moreover, it was only because of the harm in Delaware that 
the appellant has any claim. While the death could have occurred 
without the impact with the telephone pole, e.g., by spontaneous fire 
or crushing, no such damage could have transpired without the original 
collision. It is this happening that is the fons et origo of the unfor-
tunate death . . . which in turn must be imputed to the locus of 
Delaware. 
Id. at 166-67, 426 A.2d at 9. 
87. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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Delaware, then at least technically the case would be consistent with 
the "last event" test, since in reality the last event which counts 
under the test is the first that makes the claim actionable. From the 
opinion, there seems no real basis in the record for assuminOg any 
injury was sustained in Delaware; at best, in saying the initial "harm" 
happened in Delaware, the court was engaging in guess-work, ren-
dered somewhat inevitable by the speed with which events proceeded 
from the running of the initial stop sign to the explosion seconds 
later. 
Whatever guided the intuition of the court in Sacra seems 
unrelated to either the needs of the choice-of-Iaw process or the 
interests of Maryland or Delaware in regulating the affairs or pro-
tecting the interests of the people involved in the accident. The 
bizarre combination of events along the Maryland-Delaware border 
are unlikely ever again to be repeated, and hence order and predict-
ability were not served by rigid adherence to rule in the case. The 
effect of the court's decision in choosing Delaware as the place of 
the wrong was to minimize the chances of the plaintiff's recovery by 
making likely the applicability of the Delaware guest statute. 89 In 
effect, the result of the decision was likely to disable a Maryland 
family of a Maryland tort victim from recovering against a Maryland 
driver operating a Maryland garaged vehicle insured in Maryland 
because an uncertain part of the events, which led to the tragedy, 
happened outside Maryland. It is hard to imagine any Maryland 
policy to be advanced by this result, or to discern any Delaware 
interest served by it. 
D. The Public Policy Exception 
The traditional mode of working through choice-of-Iaw problems 
allowed the forum to supersede otherwise applicable foreign law 
whenever its application violated the strong public policy of the 
forum. The openendedness of the public policy exception bred 
unpredictability90 and threatened, if the courts were too liberal in its 
89. The result of the case was to allow the defendants to plead the guest statute, 
but because the record did not indicate whether a guest-host relationship actually 
existed between the driver of the camper and the decedent, the court remanded 
in Sacra for further proceedings. See Sacra, 48 Md. App. at 167, 426 A.2d at 
10. 
90. The public policy device for escaping foreign law is usually a "substitute for 
thinking" and dangerous because it is so "beguilingly easy" to employ. Monrad 
G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 
COLUM. L. REV. 969, 987 (1956). "The principal vice of the public policy 
concepts is that they provide a substitute for analysis. The concepts stand in 
the way of careful thought, of discriminating distinctions, and of true policy 
development in the conflict of laws." [d. at 10160 
94 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 23 
employment, the entire edifice of the traditional system.91 To prevent 
these evils, most statements of the exception forbade its use except 
in extremis, reserving it for those truly "extraordinary case[s)"92 in 
which the foreign rule was in some sense "pernicious and detestable"93 
or "violat[ive of] some fundamental principle of justice, some prev-
alent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the 
common weal."94 In effect, judges were admonished to follow the 
requirements of foreign law unless it would make them want to 
regurgitate to have to enforce them. 
Numerous Maryland cases express this conservative view regard-
ing the scope of the public policy exception. In Texaco, Inc. v. 
Vanden Bosche,9S the Court of Appeals of Maryland suggested the 
likely validity of a Virginia statute imposing personal liability on 
shareholders and officers of a Maryland corporation who failed to 
fulfill certain procedural requirements for registering the corporation 
to do business in the Commonwealth.96 The court stated that "a 
public policy which will permit a state to refuse to enforce rights 
created by the law of a sister state must be very strong indeed. "97 
Later, in Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bruchey,98 while rejecting 
the view that Virginia's prohibition on recovery for loss of consortium 
offended Maryland's strong public policy,99 the court pointed to 
Texaco as imposing "a heavy burden on him who urges rejection of 
foreign law on the ground of public policy. "100 
91. It has long been recognized that a willingness to find a violation of the forum's 
public policy whenever a foreign rule is dissimilar to the forum's would entirely 
eviscerate choice-of-law rules. See, e.g., Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 
16 N.W. 413 (Minn.), aff'd, 127 U.S. 210 (1883); FRANCIS WHARTON, A 
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS; OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 42 
(3d ed. 1905). Otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule and the court 
would always apply lex fori. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 
304 Md. 183, 198, 498 A.2d 605, 613 (1985) (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). 
92. HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, at 22 (3d 
ed. 1949). 
93. Herbert F. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REV. 26, 34 
(1938) (quoting Veytia v. Alvarez, 247 P. 117, 118 (Ariz. 1926». 
94. The rhetoric is Judge Cardozo's, quoted from the majority opinion in the 
leading case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918). 
95. 242 Md. 334, 219 A.2d 80 (1966). 
96. [d. at 337, 219 A.2d at 82. 
97. [d. at 340, 219 A.2d at 83. 
98. 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (1968). 
99. [d. at 674, 238 A.2d at 117. 
100. [d. at 674, 238 A.2d at 117-18. Similar statements can be found in other court 
of appeals opinions. See Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 
390, 535 A.2d 466, 467 (1988) ("the public policy must be very strong") 
(dictum); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.c. Zarnas & Co., Inc., 304 Md. 183, 
189, 498 A.2d 605, 608 (1985) (strong public policy required) (dictum). 
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In subsequent cases, Maryland courts have enforced household 
exclusion clauses valid in the state of contracting but invalid in 
Maryfand;lol gambling contracts valid where made but illegal under 
Maryland law;l02 full recovery remedies for foreign torts that would 
be "capped" had the tort occurred in Maryland;103 prohibitions on 
recovery in tort where the state of the wrong limits the plaintiff to 
no-fault remedies;l04 rules allowing tort recoveries contrary to Mar-
yland's interspousal immunity doctrine; lOS and foreign guest sta-
tutes. IOO These cases create the impression that the public policy 
exception in Maryland is very narrow. Closer inspection indicates, 
however, that this impression may be quite mistaken. In some of 
these cases, the putative Maryland policy that was being offered as 
justification for avoiding application of the otherwise applicable 
foreign rule was simply nonexistent. IOO In others, the public policy 
argument was rejected either as a mere afterthought lOS or on stare 
101. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 611 A.2d 100 (1992). 
102. See Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466 (1988). 
103. See Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md. App. 27, 606 A.2d 
295, cert. denied, 327 Md. 626, 612 A.2d 257 (1992). 
104. See Jacobs v. Adams, 66 Md. App. 779, 505 A.2d 930, cert. denied, 306 Md. 
513, 510 A.2d 259 (1986). 
105. See Rhee v. Combined Enters., 74 Md. App. 214, 536 A.2d 1197, cert. 
dismissed, 314 Md. 123, 549 A.2d 385 (1988); Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 
660, 420 A.2d 1249 (1980). 
106. See Sacra v. Sacra, 48 Md. App. 163, 426 A.2d 7 (1981). 
107. In Rhee, 74 Md. App. 214, 536 A.2d 1197, for instance, the Maryland 
interspousal immunity doctrine being offered up as justification for avoiding 
application of the full recovery rule of the locus delicti had been abolished in 
Maryland five years before Rhee came up for decision. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 
296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983). The claim in Rhee accrued only 
a month and a half before Boblitz abrogated the rule prospectively. Rhee, 74 
Md. App. at 225·27,536 A.2d at 1202·03. Under such circumstances, Maryland 
could hardly be called deeply wedded to interspousal immunity, and interspousal 
recoveries could hardly be viewed as "detestable" or "pernicious." [d. Simi· 
larly, by the time of Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 535 
A.2d 466 (1988), the court could hardly find enforcement of a gambling 
contract that was legal where made offensive to Maryland public policy when 
Maryland itself had legalized many types of gambling and had held, since 
Bender v. Arundel Arena, Inc., 248 Md. 181, 236 A.2d 7 (1967), that gambling 
debts legally incurred inside Maryland were enforceable in Maryland's courts. 
See Kramer, 311 Md. at 394·96, 535 A.2d at 469·70. Finally, in Bruchey, see 
discussion supra notes 98·100 and accompanying text, the court called the 
Maryland rule it was being asked to enforce (husband's right to recovery for 
loss of consortium) "a vestigial right" and "an 'anachronism' and 'a fossil 
from an earlier era'" that could hardly qualify as a strong public policy fit to 
override the normally applicable rule. Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 248 
Md. 669, 675, 238 A.2d liS, 118 (1968) (citations omitted). 
108. See Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md. App. 27, 39·41, 43, 
606 A.2d 295, 300·03 (Maryland cap on damages held not procedural but 
substantive, and hence inapplicable to action on New Jersey tort), cert. denied, 
327 Md. 626, 617 A.2d 257 (1992). 
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decisis grounds. I09 In still others, the public policy argument failed 
because the Maryland policy was deemed totally inapplicable to the 
foreign tort.11O 
Indeed, there is substantial evidence to suggest that Maryland 
judges are prepared to invoke the public policy exception whenever 
they believe a statutory policy of Maryland would be advanced by 
enforcement of the Maryland rule. Most of the cases declining to 
supplant the normally applicable foreign rule with a Maryland one 
did so because the Maryland rule's scope was simply found too 
narrow to encompass the foreign case. III In the few cases that have 
supplanted foreign law because of public policy, the court's ration-
alization of the result was not so much that the foreign law was 
"pernicious and detestable"l12 as that its enforcement would interfere 
with a policy set out by the Maryland legislature. 
In a series of worker's compensation cases involving suits against 
co-employees, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has consistently 
enforced the Maryland view that such suits will lie, not so much 
because the contrary foreign rule makes the court vomitous, as 
because the court thinks this is consistent with the policies of the 
109. See, e.g., Rhee, 74 Md. App. at 223-24, 536 A.2d at 1201-02 (citing Harford 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (1968»; Sacra, 48 Md. 
App. at 168, 426 A.2d at 10 (citing White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 
763 (1966); Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 420 A.2d 1249 (1980». 
110. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 532-34, 611 A.2d 100, 103-04 
(1992) (Maryland policy against household exclusion clauses insurance policies 
is limited only to cases where the clauses interfere with statutory minimum 
liability coverage requirements and hence are inapplicable to policies written 
on Florida risks to which compulsory insurance statutes do not apply; result 
would be same here even if Maryland law were applied); Black, 92 Md. App. 
at 47-48, 606 A.2d at 304-05 (purpose of cap to assure availability of liability 
insurance to Maryland enterprises inapplicable in this case involving Virginia 
plaintiffs, New Jersey accident, and corporate defendant incorporated in Vir-
ginia at time of accident who moved to Maryland shortly before action 
commenced and no longer in business in any jurisdiction); Jacobs v. Adams, 
66 Md. App. 779, 795, 505 A.2d .930, 938, cert. denied, 306 Md. 513, 510 
A.2d 259 (1986) (Maryland statute giving Maryland small claims claimants 
option of pursuing tort or uninsured motorist remedies irrelevant to small 
claims arising in District of Columbia; if there is any public policy involved 
here, it is to prevent flood of trivial suits into Maryland courts from District 
accidents that the District has seen fit to foreclose); Linton, 46 Md. App. at 
667 n.9, 420 A.2d at 1253 n.9 (allowing suits between foreign spouses will not 
endanger public welfare, health or morals of our people and, because this is 
a wrongful death case, can hardly be said to threaten marital harmony). 
Ill. See supra note 110; see also Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 
394-98, 535 A.2d 466, 469-71 (1988) (Maryland rule preventing the enforcement 
of gambling debts applied only to illegal in-state gambling and hence could 
not be used to justify nonenforcement of a gaming contract legally entered 
into in New Jersey). 
112. ct. supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
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Maryland compensation statute and the interests of Maryland. l13 In 
Hauch v. Connor,1I4 the Court of Appeals of Maryland suggested 
that statute of limitations rules warranted a lex fori reference not so 
much because they were "procedural" as because they represented 
local "public policy" regarding stale claims. liS At the very least, such 
language creates real confusion as to what the "public policy" 
justification for displacement of foreign law with local law really 
means. 116 
Adding to this confusion is a line of cases beginning with 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.c. Zarnas & CO.1I7 In Bethlehem Steel, 
the steel company had contracted with Zarnas to paint part of the 
company's Sparrows Point, Maryland plant. 118 Under the contract 
Zarnas pledged to hold harmless Bethlehem Steel from any claims 
sustained by Zarnas or its employees caused by acts or omissions of 
Bethlehem Steel or those for whom Bethlehem Steel might otherwise 
be legally responsible. 119 A Zarnas employee came in contact with 
high voltage electricity at the plant and sued the steel company.120 
The latter then brought a declaratory judgment action against Zarnas 
to have the contract declared valid. 121 Zarnas claimed the contract 
was invalid under Maryland law "because it provided for indemni-
fication for Bethlehem's sole negligence," in contravention of a 
Maryland statute declaring such contracts against public policy, void 
and unenforceable. 122 Bethlehem Steel argued that the contract's 
validity was to be evaluated under the law of Pennsylvania, the state 
113. In this area, the court has refused to analyze the cases under traditional tort 
or contract law classifications, and instead has treated them as falling under a 
new worker's compensation category. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying 
text. The principal choice-of-law rule in this area involves a balancing of state 
interests in which the policy of Maryland is extremely important, if not entirely 
dispositive. See Bishop v. Twiford, 317 Md. 170, 174-77,562 A.2d 1238,1241-
42 (1989); Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 132-33, 453 A.2d 1207, 1213-14 
(1983); Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 233, 236, 249 A.2d 449, 452, 454 
(1969). 
114. 295 Md. 120,453 A.2d 1207 (1983). 
115. Id. at 133 n.IO, 453 A.2d at 1214 n.lO. 
116. Compare the court's willingness to enforce the Maryland three-year statute of 
limitations, rather than Illinois's two year statute of limitations in Johnson v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 314 Md. 521, 552 A.2d 29 (1989), discussed supra note 
40, with the rhetoric limiting enforcement of local law on public policy grounds 
to those cases where failure to do so would be offensive to good morals. See 
supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
117. 304 Md. 183,498 A.2d 605 (1985). 
118. Id. at 185, 498 A.2d at 606. 
119. Id. at 185-86, 498 A.2d at 606. 
120. Id. at 186, 498 A.2d at 606. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 187, 498 A.2d at 607; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-305 
(1989 & Supp. 1993). 
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of execution and the prinCipal place of business between the parties, 
and that under Pennsylvania law the contract was enforceable. 123 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled for Zarnas and applied 
Maryland law. l24 The court acknowledged that foreign law could not 
be held unenforceable in Maryland simply on grounds of dissimilarity, 
and referred specificallyl2S to the two leading cases emphasizing the 
need for a "strong" public policy to displace the law of the state of 
the making of the contract- Texaco, Inc. v. Vanden Boschel26 and 
Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bruchey.127 The court noted that 
in those cases no Maryland statute was involved, whereas in Beth-
lehem Steel a statute specifically grounded on public policy appeared 
to deal with the problem. l28 But the principal distinction with these 
123. Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 188, 498 A.2d at 607-08. 
124. [d. at 193-95,498 A.2d at 610-11. 
125. [d. at 189, 498 A.2d at 608. 
126. 242 Md. 334, 219 A.2d 80 (1966); see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying 
text. 
127. Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (1968); see 
supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
128. Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 190-91, 498 A.2d at 609. At one point, the 
majority in Bethlehem Steel suggested that "[u]nless there is a contrary indi-
cation elsewhere ... the General Assembly's explicit determination of public 
policy is sufficient in a case like this to override the. lex loci contractus 
principle." [d. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608. 
In dissent, Judge Rodowsky acidly pointed out that the "statute alerts us 
to the need for analysis; the statute does not dispense with analysis." [d. at 
196, 498 A.2d at 611. He then proceeded to demonstrate that the statute in 
question was clearly not a legislatively drawn choice-of-Iaw directive, and that 
there were no case law precedents justifying the broad statement. [d. at 199-
202, 498 A.2d at 613-15. 
A number of cases following Bethlehem Steel have suggested that the fact 
that a rule is in a statute makes it a matter of public policy that would likely 
require its enforcement and that the failure of the legislature to deal with a 
matter suggests the absence of a Maryland public policy regarding the issue. 
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 611 A.2d 100 (1992). But, 
while the legislature is the primary source of public policy declarations in 
Maryland, Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 29, 557 A.2d 210, 216 (1989), it 
has never been the sole source of public policy declarations, c/. Washington 
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Queen, 324 Md. 326, 332-33, 597 A.2d 423, 426 
(1991) (declaring the prohibition on direct actions against liability insurers to 
be Maryland public policy). More importantly, the legislative source of the 
rule does not make it a public policy for choice-of-law purposes; the latter 
issue involves the extent to which its scope should be construed to include 
cases with multistate elements. See, e.g., Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 
311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466 (1988); Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 
92 Md. App. 27, 606 A.2d 295, cert. denied, 327 Md. 626, 612 A.2d 257 
(1992); Jacobs v. Adams, 66 Md. App. 779, 505 A.2d 930, cert. denied, 306 
Md. 513, 510 A.2d 259 (1986). 
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cases was not so much that Maryland's policy was stronger in 
Bethlehem Steel than it had been in Texaco or Bruchey, but that the 
state of execution's policy in Bethlehem Steel was so much weaker. 
The Bethlehem court pointed out that in Texaco and Bruchey the 
foreign state had statutes specifically covering the matter, 129 while in 
the instant case, "[n]o Pennsylvania statute expressly creates a right 
of the parties to so contract" and the parties had merely "contracted 
in Pennsylvania to do something which Pennsylvania common law 
merely tolerates. "130 The court then pointed to Pennsylvania's choice-
of-law cases to show that the state had such a weak interest that 
had the suit been· brought before its courts they would have applied 
Maryland law to nullify the indemnification clause. 131 
Judge Rodowsky, speaking for himself and Chief Judge Murphy, 
filed a vigorous dissent in Bethlehem Steel. 132 He chided the majority 
for inventing a distinction between "contracts which are valid but 
'merely tolerate [d) , and ... contracts which are valid and enthusi-
astically embraced, "133 and for threatening to substitute for the strong 
public policy exception a "balancing of interests approach. "134 Other 
judges have read Bethlehem Steel as doing precisely what Judge 
Rodowsky feared. Prior indications had been that, consistent with 
the First Restatement, the Maryland courts would not apply a doc-
trine known as renvoi. 13s The First Restatement generally forbade use 
of renvoi 136 except in narrow and particularized circumstances where 
there was a particularly strong need for outcome uniformity between 
the forum and the other jurisdiction. 13' Research has revealed no 
Maryland cases prior to Bethlehem Steel employing the doctrine, and 
Judge Kaufman had twice opined that it was not part of Maryland 
law.138 Subsequent to Bethlehem Steel, however, the federal court 
129. Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608-09. 
130. Id. at 191,498 A.2d at 609. 
131. Id. at 191 n.5, 498 A.2d at 609 n.5. 
132. See id. at 195, 498 A.2d at 611 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 197, 498 A.2d at 612 (citation omitted) (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). 
134. Id.; see also supra note 128. 
135. Under this doctrine, a court, in making its own choice of law, considers not 
only the local law of foreign jurisdictions, but also the choice-of-law principles 
those jurisdictions apply, and if it is discovered that the foreign jurisdiction 
would apply the forum's own law, the forum court "takes the renvoi" (or 
reference back) and applies its own law. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-
Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Md. 1989). 
136. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §.7. 
137. See id. § 8. 
138. See Polglase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 335, 337 (D. Md. 1975); 
Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp. 671, 682 (D. Md. 1967); see also Bostingl 
. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, N.A., 841 F.2d 1122 (4th Cir. 1988) (unreported), 
aff'g, 662 F. Supp. 882 (D. Md. 1987). 
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sitting in Maryland has read the case as authorizing the use of renvoi 
in cases involving issues of important public policy "to pierce through 
'false conflicts'" where Maryland's interests are more powerfully 
implicated than those of the other jurisdiction.l39 More recently, the 
court of special appeals has opined that Maryland law does not 
include the doctine of renvoi. 140 Because the court of appeals is 
currently considering the issue, the availability of renvoi in Maryland 
must be treated as an open question. 
A number of recent cases evidence confusion among Maryland 
judges as to the breadth of the public policy exception. The Bethlehem 
Steel case deeply split the Court of Appeals of Maryland. In a 
subsequent case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hart,141 the trial judge 
took one position, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland another, 
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland yet a different one. 142 Hart 
involved the enforceability of claims for accidental injury inflicted 
in Maryland in the face of a household exclusion clause of an 
insurance policy written in Florida on a Florida garaged car of a 
Florida couple. 143 The court of special appeals rejected the trial 
139. See Travelers Indem. Co. v Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (D. 
Md. 1989). Note that in Travelers, Judge Motz spoke of "important," not 
"strong," public policies. See id. at 1253. In a supplemental opinion in 
Travelers, Judge Motz noted that the Fourth Circuit's unreported opinion 
indicated that Maryland's courts were generally opposed to use of renvoi, id. 
at 1257 (citing Bostingl, 841 F .2d 1122), but felt that case was distinguishable, 
and that at the very least the Fourth Circuit should certify to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland the question of whether Maryland would apply a gov-
ernmental interest analysis in cases involving important areas of public policy 
like insurance and environmental law. Travelers, 718 F. Supp. at 1257. 
In a subsequent case, Judge Hargrove "indicated that Maryland would take 
the renvoi "if the law of the other jurisdiction is contrary to a strongly voiced 
public policy in Maryland .... " Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gastman, 
No. HAR-89-1629, 1990 WL 199317, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 4, 1990) (emphasis 
added), a/I'd, 1991 WL 197363 (4th Cir. Oct. 7,1991) (unpublished) (disposition 
noted at 946 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1991». Judge Hargrove was quick to note that 
this policy "differs from the recognized exception to lex loci contractus where 
a strong public policy prohibits application of a foreign law contrary to that 
policy." [d. at *7 n.5. 
Most recently, in Eastern Stainless Corp. v. American Protection Ins. Co., 
829 F. Supp. 797 (D. Md. 1993), Judge Nickerson concluded that renvoi should 
be reserved for truly "exceptional situations," and that Maryland's courts were 
strongly "inclin[ed] to adhere to the general rule of lex loci and ... burden 
... those who would urge the [c]ourt to do otherwise." [d. at 800, 801 n.4. 
140. See Artra Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 
642 A.2d 896, cert. granted, 336 Md. 354, 648 A.2d 464 (1994). 
141. 327 Md. 526, 611 A.2d 100 (1992). 
142. [d. 
143. Id. at 528, 611 A.2d at 101. 
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judge's refusal to enforce Maryland's exclusion of such clauses on 
public policy grounds,l44 only to be reversed by the court of appeals 
two years later. In rejecting the position of the trial court, which 
applied lex loci contractus, the court of special appeals relied on 
Bethlehem Steel. It held that Maryland public policy was sufficient 
to override the lex loci rule wherever the legislature has specifically 
addressed a kind of contractual clause and unequivocally declared it 
null and void. 14s 
In Hart, the court of appeals overruled the intermediate court's 
decision on the ground that Maryland's statutory rejection of family 
exclusion clauses "was not based on any general or historic principle 
of public policy," but instead was limited to cases involving Mary-
land's requirements for minimum liability coveragel46 in Maryland-
written insurance contracts. 147 This led the court to conclude that the 
clause was enforceable because there was no conflict, and that it was 
valid under the law of both Florida and Maryland,l48 and alternatively 
that the Maryland public policy was simply not "sufficiently strong 
... [to] justify disregarding the lex loci contractus principle under 
the facts of this case. "149 The court then added a footnote: 
[W]e are not holding that the lex loci contractus principle 
will always be applied to household exclusion clauses in 
insurance policies. For example, if a family had lived in 
Florida when the insurance policy on the family automobile 
was issued in Florida, but moved to Maryland during the 
life of the policy, and if Maryland law required that the 
family car be registered in Maryland, the Maryland com-
pulsory insurance statutes ... would seem to mandate that 
the household exclusion clause not be enforced to the extent 
of the minimum required liability coverage. ISO 
More recently, in Ward v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co., lSI the Court of Appeals of Maryland divided over 
whether Maryland should enforce a District of Columbia law that 
purported to force victims of auto accidents in the District to elect 
144. Hart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Md. App. 642, 648, 577 A.2d 373, 376 (1990). 
145. [d. at 646-47, 577 A.2d at 375. 
146. Hart, 327 Md. at 532, 611 A.2d at 103. 
147. Id. at 533, 611 A.2d at 103. 
148. [d. at 534, 611 A.2d at 103-04. 
149. [d. at 534, 611 A.2d at 104. 
150. [d. at 534 n.l, 611 A.2d at 104 n.l (citation omitted). The obvious purpose 
of this footnote in Hart was to clarify. Its obvious effect is to muddy. 
151. 328 Md. 240, 614 A.2d 85 (1992). 
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between collecting personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from 
their driver's insurer or to sue a third-party tortfeasor in tort. 152 
Judge Chasanow, dissenting, took the view that District law applied, 
forced the election, and, because the plaintiff had already recovered 
PIP benefits, barred the instant action in tort.153 The majority disa-
greed, not on the choice-of-Iaw issue,Is4 but on the proper construc-
tion of District of Columbia law. ISS Under the majority's position, 
no election was required under either District or Maryland law, and 
hence the tort action could proceed. ls6 The court acknowledged, 
however, that if Judge Chasanow was correct in his construction of 
District law, grave choice-of-Iaw issues would be presented to it l57 
under the doctrines of Hauch v. ConnorlS8 and Bishop v. Twiford. 159 
Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has 
suggested that there is a need for the court of appeals to examine 
whether to continue adherence to the First Restatement, at least with 
respect to its contract rule, lex loci contractus. In Commercial Union 
Insurance Co. v. Porter Hayden CO.,I60 the plaintiff, a Maryland 
corporation, sued an out-of-state insurer for indemnification for 
liabilities the plaintiff was under because of its installation of asbestos 
insulation in industrial plants in Maryland. If the policy was evaluated 
under New York law, it would be found to be unenforceable because 
notice of occurrence had been untimely filed; if the policy were 
evaluated under Maryland law, it would be. enforceable because the 
notice, while not timely, had not prejudiced the insurer in any way. 
The court of special appeals discussed at length the Second Restate-
ment rules, under which it seemed clear that Maryland would be the 
state with the most significant relationship because it was the situs 
of the principal insurable risk. 161 The court felt constrained by 
precedent to apply the law of the place of making, which it found 
to be in New York, even as it invited the court of appeals to consider 
"the instant case as presenting an appropriate opportunity to recon-
sider Maryland's adherence to the place of contracting rule." 162 The 
152. /d. at 242, 614 A.2d at 85. 
153. See id. at 254, 614 A.2d at 92 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). 
154. Id. at 247, 614 A.2d at 88. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 253, 614 A.2d at 91. Interestingly, Ward cited Hart both for the general 
applicability of the lex loci contractus position and as grounds for refusing to 
supplant it under Maryland's "narrow public policy exception." See Ward, 
328 Md. at 246-47, 614 A.2d at 88. 
157. Id. at 253 n.8, 614 A.2d at 92 n.8. 
158. 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). 
159. 317 Md. 170, 562 A.2d 1238 (1989). 
160. 97 Md. App. 442, 630 A.2d 261, cert. granted, 333 Md. 201, 634 A.2d 62 
(1993). 
161. Id. at 455-57, 630 A.2d at 268-69. 
162. Id. at 457, 630 A.2d at 269. 
1993] Modern Maryland Conflicts 103 
court acknowledged the public policy/renvoi cases in the Bethlehem 
Steel line, but seemed perplexed by them; 163 quite parenthetically, it 
dismissed them as simply "not applicable to the present case. "164 
At the very least, the recent "public policy" exception cases in 
Maryland indicate a radical shift away from the narrow confines of 
the era of Texaco and Bruchey, when Maryland's courts would refuse 
to apply the otherwise applicable substantive law only when it was 
viewed as "pernicious and detestable."165 Precisely what has been 
added is unclear. There is suggestion that a matter violates Maryland 
public policy if there is a Maryland statute speaking to the matter; 
but the question in such cases cannot be answered simply by citing 
the statute, but must be answered by ascertaining whether it governs 
the case. Cases like Ward and Hart fudge on whether they are 
refusing to displace a Maryland rule with a contrary foreign rule 
because of public policy or are simply enforcing a foreign law because 
a second look has revealed it is really consistent with the Maryland 
rule and hence there is no conflict. l66 Where the foreign rule does 
differ from Maryland's, cases like Bethlehem Steel impliedly author-
ize, on clearly watered down public policy grounds, use of renvoi to 
soften the bite of the otherwise content-neutral choice-of-Iaw rules, 167 
and those like Hauch v. Connor even authorize on public policy 
grounds creation of whole new categories of cases to advance Mar-
yland's interests. l68 Yet Maryland judges-at least those on the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland who heard the Commercial Union 
163. Id. at 454, 630 A.2d at 267. The court did not cite Bethlehem Steel b.ut did 
discuss Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252 (D. 
Md. 1989), discussed supra notes 135, 139. 
164. Id. The explanation is difficult to fathom. While it cited no New York choice-
of-law cases, it did rely upon a text, SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7, § 18.21 (2d 
ed. 1992), for a categorization of how each state would approach conflict-of-
laws problems in contract. The source cited indicates that New York either 
follows the Second Restatement, the center of gravity, or interest analysis in 
contract cases. See id. § 18.21 nn.3, 5. Under either of these approaches, a 
New York court entertaining Commercial Union would have applied Maryland 
law. Hence, had the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland taken the renvoi, 
as the Bethlehem Steel line of cases suggests it should have, the result would 
have been to render the contract enforceable under Maryland law. 
More recently, in Artra Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 
Md. App. 728, 642 A.2d 896, cert. granted, 336 Md. 354, 648 A.2d 464 (1994), 
the court of special appeals cited Porter Hayden Co. for the proposition that 
renvoi has no place in Maryland law. The court of appeals' grant of certiorari 
in Artra Group, Inc. indicates that the intermediate appellate court's renvoi 
declaration is open for reevaluation. 
165. See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra notes 117-39 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 60-69, 113-16 and accompanying text. 
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casel69-appeared uncomfortable employing either rationale, even un-
der circumstances where either seemed readily available, 170 and instead 
felt the only principled way out was to invite the court of appeals 
to jettison the First Restatement. 
II. MODERN MARYLAND CONFLICTS LAW 
A. Early Indicators of Policy Analysis 
Although cases like White v. King171 and Hauch v. Connor172 
pledge, at least formally, an unyielding allegiance to the territorialist 
principles of the First Restatement on grounds of promoting certainty 
and predictability, there have been indications of a more policy-
oriented approach to choice-of-Iaw even before cases like Bethlehem 
Steel, Bishop v. Twiford, and Hauch itself suggested a fraying at 
the edges of the pledge. Perhaps the earliest indications of this 
tendency are the Maryland cases softe~ing the bite of traditional 
rules on account of policies favoring party autonomy. 
One group of these cases involves the distributIon of estates. A 
basic policy of all states, as evidenced by the uniform adoption of 
statutes of wills, is to afford people broad freedom to control the 
passage of title to their property upon death. The traditional choice-
of-law rules required a domiciliary reference for the devolution of 
personal property173 and a situs reference for succession to estates in 
land. 174 The Maryland cases strongly indicate frequent subordination 
of these rules to the policy of effectuating testamentary intent. 
In part this tendency was encouraged by legislation, first enacted 
in 1884,175 that directed Maryland's courts to validate a will even 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 159-63. 
170. The Allied-Signal case is so close to Commercial Union that it is hard to 
understand why the court felt so sure the public policy/renvoi doctrine was 
inapplicable. As indicated supra at note 163, had Commercial Union applied 
the whole law of the state of contracting, New York (i.e., taken the renvoi), 
it likely would have gotten a reference back to Maryland. Alternatively, there 
seems to be no good reason why the court could not have created a new rule, 
in the manner of Hauch v. Connor, for a wholly new category of cases-
liability insurance policies-to promote the regulatory interests of the state of 
principal insurable risk. Either alternative would have been more true to the 
Maryland precedents than what the court suggested, which was the complete 
abandonment of lex loci contractus. 
171. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966); see supra notes 3-4 and 
accompanying text. 
172. Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983); see supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
173. See supra notes 20, 27 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 18, 26 and accompanying text. 
175. See Act of April 8, 1884, ch. 293, § 307, 1884 Md. Laws 403 (codified as 
amended at MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-104(3) (1993». 
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though it failed Maryland's own requirements for execution if it was 
valid under the law of the state where it was executed or the law of 
the domicile of the decedent. 176 The purpose of this legislation was 
to assure that the intent of the testator would be vindicated if she 
was acting under circumstances which would have led her reasonably 
to believe that what she was doing would have legal effect. 177 
But the tendency of the courts to enforce the intent of the 
testator went further than was required by the statute. In dealing 
with trusts set up by testators, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
was willing to validate trusts regarding property situated in one state, 
even though this violated the law of the state of domicile, in order 
to effectuate testamentary intent;178 to construe liberally the methods 
by which powers of appointment could be executed so as to enforce 
testamentary intent;179 and even to declare a willingness to allow a 
testator to choose whatever law he wished to govern his bequests. 18o 
What Fletcher v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 181 noted of charitable 
trusts-that "[c]ourts tend, unhampered by any fixed conflict-of-
laws rule, to sustain [them if they] do not violate the policy of any 
state concerned" 182-could easily be said about all testamentary trusts, 
176. The legislative history of the present statute is discussed extensively in Judge 
Orth's opinion for the court in Wright v. Nugent, 23 Md. App. 337, 346-49, 
328 A.2d 362, 368-70 (1974), aiI'd, 275 Md. 290, 338 A.2d 898 (1975) (per 
curiam). The opinion explains a variety of statutory amendments over the 
years. It briefly mentions that, in its original form, the statute sustained a 
will's formal validity if it was valid in the place of execution or "place where 
[the testator] was residing when the [will or other testamentary instrument] was 
made," but was amended in 1894 in such a way that the quoted language gave 
way to the "testator's domicile." Wright, 23 Md. App. at 347, 328 A.2d at 
368-69. Judge Orth does not explain why this amendment was made, and it is 
unclear whether the new language adverts to domicile at the time of execution, 
domicile at the time of death, or both. 
177. Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 252, 271, 63 A. 566, 569 (1906); see also Roach 
v. Jurchak, 182 Md. 646, 649, 35 A.2d 817, 819 (1944); Olivet v. Whitworth, 
82 Md. 258, 276, 33 A. 723, 724 (1896). 
178. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 193 Md. 400, 67 A.2d 386 
(1949) (although charitable bequest invalid under law of testator's domicile 
because of indefiniteness, it will be upheld because it is valid under the law of 
the state where it is to be administered); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Uhrig, 145 
Md. 114, 125 A. 606 (1924) (bequest to Maryland charity invalid under law of 
testator's domicile but valid in Maryland, where trust was to be administered, 
and therefore upheld); cj. Smith v. Mercantile Trust Co., 199 Md. 264, 86 
A.2d 504 (1952) (refusing to displace New York law with law of situs of 
property where circumstances did not support inference that situs law was 
intended by testator). 
179. See Olivet, 82 Md. at 276, 33 A. at 724. 
180. Smith, 199 Md. at 273-74, 86 A.2d at 508 (dictum). 
181. 193 Md. 400, 67 A.2d 386 (1949). 
182. Id. at 415, 67 A.2d at 392 (citation omitted) (quoting Beach v. Gilbert, 133 
F.2d 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (citing 2 BEALE, supra note 2, § 295.1». 
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and strongly supports the view that policy was given enormous play 
in this area. 
The tendency to support party autonomy is not limited to the 
estates area, but extends into the contracts area as well. Maryland 
courts routinely uphold choice-of-Iaw provisions in contracts that 
may well vary the applicable law from that of the law of the place 
of making of a contract,183 at least unless enforcement of such clauses 
would violate Maryland's public policy.l84 Most recently, the Mary-
land courts have indicated that they will follow the Second Restate-
ment in upholding such clauses, unless they conflict with a fundamental 
policy of a state that has a materially greater interest in the matter 
than the chosen state and is the state the law of which would 
otherwise have been applicable. 18s While Maryland does not go so 
far as to apply lex validitatis,186 even with respect to debt actions 
and the dubious defense of usury, 187 there is indication that they will 
183. See, e.g., Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980); Williams 
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 122 Md. 141,89 A. 97 (1913) (dictum). 
184. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullan, 107 Md. 457, 69 A. 385 (1908). 
185. See Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190,231,469 A.2d 867, 887, 
cert. denied, 298 Md. 310, 469 A.2d 864 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 
(1985) (relying upon SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 187). 
The federal courts routinely indicate that Maryland will enforce choice-of-
law clauses in contract actions. See, e.g., Satellite Fin. Planning v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 633'F. Supp. 386 (D. Del. 1986). Construing Maryland law, a federal 
court of appeals has indicated that it believes Maryland would go so far as to 
follow MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), and enforce 
a contractual forum selection clause which in effect divested the local courts 
of jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim. See General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin 
Marietta Alumina, 783 F:2d 352, 358 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986). Should the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland take the position predicted by the Third Circuit, that 
would go a long way toward reinforcing Maryland's commitment to party 
autonomy. 
186. Cj. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 97 Md. App. 442, 630 
A.2d 261, cert. granted, 333 Md. 201, 643 A.2d 62 (1993), discussed supra at 
notes 159-63. Professor Albert Ehrenzweig claimed that courts in virtually all 
nations tend to apply that law which will validate (hence, lex validitatis) because 
of the overriding desirability of upholding the sanctity of contracts and security 
of transactions. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 2, §§ 175-76. There is some 
disagreement in the literature about the extent to which courts should enforce 
his presumption of validity. Compare RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7.4B-7.4F, 7.5 (3d ed. 1986) (courts should 
enforce the presumption of validity) and Willis L.M. Reese, Power oj Parties 
to Choose Law Governing Their Contracts, 1960 PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 
49, 51 (courts tend to enforce the presumption), with Brainerd Currie, Ehren-
zweig and the Statute oj Frauds: An Inquiry into the "Rule oj Validation," 
18 OKLA. L. REv. 243 (1965) (arguing that Ehrenzweig had misread the cases) 
and Tracy A. Westen, Comment, Usury in the Conflict oj Laws: The Doctrine 
oj Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL. L. REv. 123 (1967) (lex debitoris, or law of debtor's 
domicile, governs usury cases). 
187. Maryland enforces the law of the state of making in actions in debt where 
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infer an intention to make a state the state of making in order to 
enforce the underlying intention of the parties to create a binding 
agreement. 188 
In addition to the party autonomy cases, Maryland case law 
contains occasional hints that some form of policy analysis might 
inform the court's judgment as to how to apply the traditional 
system. For example, Milton v. Escue,l89 in answering whether a 
young Virginia woman could inherit Maryland lands from her pu-
tative father, the court declined to characterize the issue as relating 
to intestate succession to realty, thus requiring application of situs 
law, and instead characterized the issue as relating to legitimacy and 
applied the law of the woman and her parents' domicile,l90 As the 
court indicated, Professor Beale and the First Restatement both 
supported the characterization it made. 191 What the court did not do 
is explain why this characterization was correct, although it is likely 
that its chief purpose was sub silentio to protect the paramount 
interests of the state of the family, and thus sidestep "the nuisance 
that [rigid adherence to] the situs rule" would lead to .192 A short 
time later, the court of appeals acknowledged the possibility of a 
limited class of cases involving foreign claims among nonresidents in 
which Maryland might not allow the claim to go forward under its 
own statute of limitations but time bar the claim because "the action 
is barred outright in the state where it accrued."193 And in the 
immediate aftermath of its own reaffirmation in White v. King that 
under lex loci delicti the rights of Maryland residents could be 
that state's law would invalidate the contract as usurious. See New York Sec. 
& Trust Co. v. Davis, 96 Md. 81, 53 A. 669 (1902); Eastwood v. Kennedy, 
44 Md. 563 (1876). This position is rejected by the Second Restatement, see 
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 203, and has been rejected by many 
courts in favor of alternative reference, or application of the validating law of 
whatever state that has a substantial relationship to the transaction. The leading 
alternative reference case is Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 
403 (1927). 
188. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Baltimore Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co., 212 Md. 506, 511, 129 A.2d 815, 819 (1957) ("[T]he proper law 
governing a ... note is the law which the parties to the instrument intended 
to govern."); cf, Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137 (1882) ("The parties 
cannot be presumed to have contemplated a law which would defeat their 
engagements. "). 
189. 201 Md. 190, 93 A.2d 258 (1952). 
190. [d. at 205, 93 A.2d at 265. 
191. [d. at 205-06, 93 A.2d at 265 (citing 2 BEALE, supra note 2, § 140.2, at 712; 
FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 139, 141); see supra notes 45-47 and 
accompanying text. 
192. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.6, at 
399 (2d ed. 1980). But see supra note 26, infra note 200 (discussing Harrison 
v. Prentice, 183 Md. 474, 38 A.2d 101 (1944». 
193. Osborn v. Swetnam, 221 Md. 216, 220, 156 A.2d 654, 656 (1959). 
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determined under a foreign guest-host statute despite the interest 
Maryland had in applying Maryland law to its own citizens, the court 
of appeals indicated that the Maryland residency of the parties and 
center of their relationship justified allowing them to belatedly litigate 
the question of whether there was a gratuitous guest-host relationship 
despite their failure to raise it prior to the White decision. '94 
Notwithstanding the party autonomy cases and occasional early 
hints at policy analysis, it must be acknowledged that, as a general 
matter, the Maryland courts adhered steadfastly to the requirements 
of the traditional system until very recent times. Typical of this 
adherence was Union Trust Co. v. Knabe. 19s In Knabe, a Maryland 
married woman guaranteed a loan made by a New Jersey corporation 
to her husband. Technically, the guaranty became binding only when 
the loan issued, which occurred in New Jersey, and so under the 
place of making rule that state's law should have applied. The 
Maryland woman was not disabled from binding herself under Mary-
land law; her defense, if any, required the application of the New 
Jersey rule. Counsel argued that New Jersey's married women's 
property act was not meant to protect non-New Jersey women, and 
hence the statute did not apply. Acceptance of this argument would 
have been tantamount to acknowledgement of the force of interest 
analysis. '96 The Knabe court flatly rejected this kind of analysis. '97 
Furthermore, the Maryland cases were generally faithful to the rules, 
refusing to utilize escape devices to avoid the unattractive results the 
rules led to. This was true in their early rejection of renvoi,'98 their 
limited use of public policy,'99 and their refusal to engage in disin-
genuous characterization to avoid untoward results. 2OO In short, as a 
practical matter, the rules of the First Restatement held a tight wrap 
on Maryland conflicts doctrine, . a wrap relaxed only infrequently. 
194. See Earl v. Anchor Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 246 Md. 653, 659, 229 A.2d 412, 416 
(1967). 
195. 122 Md. 584, 89 A. 1106 (1914). 
196. Cj. Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Property Contracts: A Study in Conflict 
0/ Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). 
197. See Knabe, 122 Md. at 609, 89 A. at 1115. 
198. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text. 
200. See; for example, Harrison v. Prentice, 183 Md. 474, 38 A.2d 101 (1944), 
wherein the Maryland court applied Maryland law and awarded an intestate 
share of Maryland land to an estranged British husband of his deceased British 
wife, when under the law of their common domicile the husband would have 
received nothing. It is hard to see why it was less officious to visit Maryland's 
family law policies on Britain in Harrison than it would have been' to visit 
them on Virginia in Milton v. Escue, discussed supra notes 188-90, and the 
court of appeals certainly could have used characterization to avoid intermed-
dling in the domestic relations affairs of another state, but it refused to do 
so. 
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B. Recent Developments 
Recent cases suggest that the tight wrap is unraveling. The long 
coexistence between the incipient policy analysis in the party auton-
omy cases and cases like Milton v. Escue, on the one hand, and the 
rigid jurisdiction selection rules of traditional analysis evidenced by 
cases like Knabe, on the other, seems to be breaking apart. When 
the gauntlet was thrown down challenging the traditional system in 
White v. King, 201 the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged 
the trend away from lex loci delictp02 and "recognize[d] the force of 
the countervailing arguments,"203 but refused to budge because of 
stare decisis and the uncertainty of just how the new developments 
would work out.204 The court's affirmation of the virtues of the 
ancient regime was masterfully indirect: 
In what we have said, we do not intend any implication 
that lex loci delicti is, in general, in our opinion, an unjust 
rule. Hardship may result in a particular case, but that, 
unfortunately, is true under any general legal principle. 
Certainty in the law is not so common that, where it exists, 
it is to be lightly discarded. We recognize the force of the 
countervailing arguments, but in the present state of the 
law, we leave any change in the established doctrine to the 
Legislature.205 
However apologetically, White at least rigidly enforced lex loci. 
Hauch v. Connor,206 while paying lip service to the doctrine,207 
avoided its results by creating a new category of cases208 involving 
the side effects of worker's compensation laws in which Maryland's 
statutory and common-law policies of encouraging recoveries for 
injuries sustained on the job could be advanced through the appli-
cation of Maryland law. 209 But Hauch did more. In the worker's 
compensation area, at least, it inaugurated not just a new category, 
but a new methodology for working through conflicts issues, one 
that requires the court to balance the interests of all the involved 
states. In Hauch, the court said Maryland's law should be applied 
because, "although the injury did not occur in Maryland, there are 
greater Maryland interests. "210 
201. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). 
202. [d. at 352-53, 223 A.2d at 765-66. 
203. [d. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767. 
204. [d. 
205. [d. (emphasis added). 
206. 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). 
207. [d. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210. 
208. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
210. 295 Md. at 133, 453 A.2d at 1214. 
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This became fully evident six years later in Bishop v. Twiford. 211 
Bishop, a Pennsylvanian, sued Twiford, a Maryland resident, in 
Maryland's federal court. Both Bishop and Twiford worked for a 
common corporate employer, a Delaware-based corporation. Bishop 
was Twiford's supervisor and a passenger in a company car driven 
by Twiford that crashed in Maryland, causing Bishop injury. If 
Maryland law applied, Bishop's case could go forward; if Delaware 
law were applied, the co-employee suit would fail. The Fourth Circuit 
certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland the question of whether 
Hauch and an earlier case, Hutzell v. Boyer,212 required application 
of the law of Maryland or that of Delaware. 
The Bishop opinion indicates full-blown acceptance of the bal-
ancing approach in cases dealing with what law should be applied 
to co-employee suits. The court acknowledged Maryland's strong 
policy of promoting compensation under both its common law of 
tort and its worker's compensation statute, but said that the 
public policy of [Maryland] is not itself dispositive. Other 
factors in the present case favoring application of Maryland 
law are that the injury occurred in Maryland, the defendant 
was a resident of Maryland, and the defendant's primary 
place of employment is in Maryland. . . . Moreover, the 
situs of the employment relationship involved in the present 
case, i.e., Bishop's supervision of Twiford ... was largely 
Maryland. 213 
The only significant Delaware contact the court found was that the 
employer was headquartered there.214 Given this sole contact, Dela-
ware's interests in applying its rule paled in comparison to Mary-
land's.m 
When reading Bishop, there are times that one may doubt the 
clarity of the court's thinking.216 The court's opinion .seems to be 
211. 317 Md. 170,562 A.2d 1238 (1989). 
212. 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969). Hutzell's relationship to Hauch is noted 
supra notes 67-68. 
213. Bishop, 317 Md. at 176-77, 562 A.2d at 1242. 
214. The court dismissed Twiford's argument that Bishop's primary place of em-
ployment was in Delaware because it appeared that although he spent more 
working time there than any other single jurisdiction, he spent the majority of 
his working days in states other than Delaware. [d. The court felt it appropriate 
to disregard the fact that the corporation had paid medical expenses in accord 
with Delaware's worker's compensation statute because the payments made 
were also consistent with Maryland's worker's compensation statute and the 
record was too sketchy to determine which state's statute applied. [d. at 177, 
562 A.2d at 1242. 
215. [d. at 176, 562 A.2d at 1241. 
216. At one point in the Bishop opinion, the court stated that even if under the 
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engaged in contact counting more than it is in defining and weighing 
state interests in a disciplined or coherent way. 217 Acknowledging that 
its first steps toward a new methodology for resolving conflicts issues 
seem clumsy cannot ignore the fact that the steps are being taken. 
Nor do recent cases indicate that such steps are confined to the 
determination of what remedies the courts should grant or deny to 
people injured at work. The new public policy cases run the gamut 
of substantive areas of legislative concern to Maryland, reaching 
from insurance coverage for household members218 and the regulation 
of gambling,219 to the limiting or capping of recoveries220 and the 
enforceability of "hold harmless" clauses in contracts.221 A number 
of these cases appear to be seeking to avoid responsibility for 
judicially resolving the conflict; when they decide to enforce the other 
Maryland choice-of-Iaw statute governing worker's compensation benefits Mar-
yland would have found the Delaware statute applicable in determining an 
employer's liability for worker's compensation on the facts of the case, this 
still would not have been determinative of the issue of whether the plaintiff 
could sue a fellow employee. ld. at 173 n.4, 562 A.2d at 1240 n.4. This 
statement is hard to square with the forthright declaration, at the end of its 
opinion, that "Maryland's worker's compensation law, rather than Delaware's 
statute, is determinative," id. at 177, 562 A.2d at 1242, or with the whole line 
of cases from Hutzell through Hauch that had indicated that the right vel non 
to sue a co-employee was tied to the statutory scheme for assuring worker's 
compensation rights to the employee and limiting the employer's rights. Cf 
Athas v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 476 A.2d 710 (1984) (indicating that the rule of 
Hutzell that co-employee suits would lie in Maryland does not mean an 
employee can sue her supervisor, because such a suit would essentially be for 
his breach of the employer's duty to provide a safe work environment, and 
allowing it would be inconsistent with the employer's statutory immunity to 
common-law tort liability). 
217. Early critics addressed precisely the same criticism to the first drafts of the 
Second Restatement. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict oj 
Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS 
LAW 349 (1961); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A 
Last Appeal jor Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230 (1965). The criticism 
has persisted into recent years. See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.30, at 378 (3d ed. 1986) (warning of "grave 
danger that [the Restatement] will be interpreted to direct the counting of 
physical contacts ... and awarding the palm to the state with the 'most' 
contacts"). 
218. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 611 A.2d 100 (1992); discussion 
supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text. 
219. See Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466 (1988). 
220. See Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md. App. 27, 606 A.2d 
295 (statutory cap on damages recoveries), cert. denied, 327 Md. 626, 612 A.2d 
257 (1992); Jacobs v. Adams, 66 Md. App. 779, 505 A.2d 930, cert. denied, 
J06 Md. 513, 510 A.2d 259 (1986) (limitation of tort victims to no-fault 
remedies). 
221. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 
(19"85) (discussed supra notes 117-39 and accompanying text). 
112 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 23 
state's law, they suggest that the Maryland statute in the substantive 
area simply does not reach the issue,222 and when they decide to 
enforce Maryland's law, they suggest that the Maryland statute 
preempts any alternative choice223 or that the foreign law does not 
reach the issue covered by the Maryland rule.224 Years ago, Brainerd 
Currie, the father of the "interest analysis" school for resolving 
conflict-of-Iaws issues, suggested that one solution to a number of 
apparent conflicts between local policies and those of other jurisdic-
tions is to adopt a restrained and moderate construction of the forum 
state's policy or that of the other jurisdiction.22S This is precisely 
what the Maryland public policy cases are doing. 
The balancing is done indirectly through the process of renvoi 
in cases like Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & CO.,226 and 
has been clearly acknowledged by both those who detract from the 
process227 and those who seem to' embrace it. 228 Without openly 
admitting it, the other public policy cases, like Currie and his 
followers,229 engage in balancing forum interests against those of 
222. See supra notes 110-11. 
223. E.g., Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. 183,498 A.2d 605; see supra notes 117-31 and 
accompanying text. 
224. See Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 328 Md. 240, 614 A.2d 85 
(1992); supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text. 
225. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 186; Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third 
State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,757 (1963); Brainerd Currie, The Silver 
Oar and All That: A Study oj the Romero Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65-
75 (1959). Currie vehemently denied that use of such moderation and restraint 
was the same thing as "weighing" state interests, of which he strongly disap-
proved. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 1, at 181-82. But, Currie himself 
occasionally slipped and admitted that a forum might forego applying its own 
law when its policy was "relatively weak," id. at 118, and his critics strongly 
condemned him for denying that weighing was necessary, see, e.g., William F. 
Baxter, Choice oj Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 18-22 
(1963); Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict oj Laws-A Reply 
to Projessor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463,474-77 (1960). 
226. 304 Md. 183,498 A.2d 605 (1985); see supra notes 117-31 and accompanying 
text. 
227. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 195, 498 A.2d at 611 (Rodowsky, J., 
dissenting); see also supra notes 128, 132-34 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra note 139. 
229. In discussing Currie's treatment of Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 
358 U.S. 354 (1959), in The Silver Oar and All That: A Study oj the Romero 
Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1959), David Cavers said he saw no difference 
between Currie's approach and balancing state interests. See David F. Cavers, 
The Changing Choice-oj-Law Process, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 734 
n.9 (1963). Currie came close to admitting as much in a later piece. See 
Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
754 (1963). Professor Ehrenzweig indicated that, "as far as I can see, all courts 
and writers who have professed acceptance of Currie's interest language have 
transformed it by indulging in that very weighing and balancing of interests 
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other states through ad hoc narrowing or broadening of the stated 
scope of domestic and foreign· rules. 
As in the early development of the co-employee suit cases, the 
public policy balancing act that the courts in Maryland are practicing 
is clumsy. It is difficult to reconcile the reasoning in one case to that 
of another or to predict when a Maryland public policy will be found 
relevant and strong enough to displace a foreign rule. The court of 
special appeals' recent, and almost deliberate, avoidance of public 
policy arguments230 indicates that confusion is so great that it is time, 
as suggested by that court, to consider a new approach-reconsid-
eration of Maryland's continued adherence to the First Restatement. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Nearly thirty years ago, in White v. King, 23 I the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland declined to develop a new theory because, it said, the 
certainty secured by the First Restatement should not "be lightly 
discarded" given "the [then] present state of the law. "232 White was 
a guest-host immunity case brought in the aftermath of New York's 
abandonment of lex loci delicti in a similar guest-host case three 
years earlier in Babcock v. Jackson.233 At the time White was decided 
only four states had abandoned lex loci in tort cases234 and the 
Second Restatement, though it had been in development since 1953, 
was five years short of its 1971 adoption date. The rest of the country 
at least formally adhered to the First Restatemen( "monolith. "235 
Today, the American legal landscape is entirely different. The Second 
Restatement is the "majority rule" and the adherents of the First 
Restatement have become a stubborn, but consistently dwindling, 
minority.236 Moreover, commentators today are in substantial agree-
ment that, while there remains considerable flux in the law, "an 
from which Currie refrained." Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution 
in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377, 389 (1966). 
230. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 97 Md. App. 442, 630 
A.2d 261, cert. granted, 333 Md. 201, 634 A.2d 62 (1993) (discussed supra 
notes 159-63 and accompanying text). 
231. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). 
232. [d. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767; see discussion supra notes 3-4 and accompanying 
text. 
233. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
234. In addition to the New York decision in Babcock, there had been similar guest-
host immunity decisions in Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966), and 
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 1965), and a rejection of lex loci 
delicti in order to avoid the state of the wrong's limitation on death damages 
in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964). 
235. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-oj-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 359 (1992). 
236. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
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accommodation is taking place" under developing case law237 and 
that "the courts are combining the scholarly theories in an eclectic 
(or ecumenical) fashion that is gradually producing a fairly consistent 
body of law on choice of law.' '238 
Changes in the legal landscape much less marked than that in 
American conflicts law have previously led the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland to reexamine earlier cases in other areas. For example, in 
Julian v. Christopher,239 the court of appeals overruled its prior 
holding concerning "silent consent" clauses in residential leases. In 
Jacobs v. Klawans,240 the court held that when a lease contained a 
clause prohibiting a tenant from subletting or assigning without the 
landlord's consent, the landlord had a right to withhold consent even 
though such action was arbitrary and unreasonable. In rejecting the 
stare decisis impact of the earlier case, the court of appeals pointed 
out that at the time Klawans was decided the Restatement (First) oj 
Propertjl41 and the overwhelming weight of authority were consistent 
with it, but that in the ensuing years the Restatement (Second) oj 
Property,242 as well as a substantial and burgeoning minority of state 
courts, had created a solid trend in the opposite direction.243 These 
changes made it much easier for the court of appeals to recognize 
that public policies against restraints on alienation and in favor of 
good faith and fair dealing in contractual relations justified a new 
rule that prevented arbitrary and capricious landlord limitations on 
a tenant's ability to sublet or assign her lease.244 
Even before recent cases began to transform the local law of 
conflicts in Maryland, there was some question whether Maryland 
conflicts law was as certain and predictable as adherents to the older 
view would have us believe. During recent years, while conflicts law 
has undergone a seachange outside Maryland, the Maryland courts 
have almost imperceptibly moved away from what would have been 
permissible under the territorialist strictures of Professor Beale and 
the First Restatement. 
The changes in Maryland conflicts law have created tensions that 
threaten to shred the bonds of territorialist theory that have held it 
together and made it coherent for so long. Maryland conflicts law 
has moved into uncertainty at precisely the time that conflicts law 
237. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7, § 2.16, at 41. 
238. LEFLAR, supra note 2, § 4, at 8 (footnote omitted). 
239. 320 Md. I, 575 A.2d 735 (1990). 
240. 225 Md. 147, 169 A.2d 677 (1961), overruled by Julian v. Christopher, 320 
Md. I, 575 A.2d 735 (1990). 
241. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 410 (1944). 
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2 (1977). 
243. Julian, 320 Md. at 4-6, 575 A.2d at 736-37. 
244. [d. at 8, 575 A.2d at 738. 
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in the rest of the country is beginning to gel and to develop precedents 
that courts in other jurisdictions are using to create a predictable 
body of conflicts law. It is time for the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
to take a fresh look at the issues presented in White v. King, with 
a view toward ·overruling it. 
Even if Maryland conflicts doctrine was not unstable, Maryland 
lawyers would face a daunting task in working through choice-of-
law problems for their clients. As more and more clients encounter 
problems arising from activities in far flung places, increasingly 
involving foreign countries as well as other states, the need to be 
familiar with the rules and conventions of other states grows. The 
ability to quickly access their local law and to assess the likelihood 
of its being applied has long been important for Maryland attor-
neys.24S . 
The fact that other states' choice-of-Iaw regimes differ so radi-
cally from Maryland's complicates this task immensely, because it 
compels Maryland lawyers not only to be able to evaluate how a 
case may come out in Maryland's courts, but also to determine how 
the same case might come out under substantially different sets of 
choice-of-Iaw principles of. other states. The fact that Maryland's 
courts have so long held onto traditional principles while most other 
states' conflicts jurisprudence has been thoroughly overhauled has 
created a wide gulf between Maryland doctrine and foreign doctrine, 
such that some Maryland practitioners may have difficulty even 
comprehending the language and structure of foreign conflicts law, 
much less its details. This vastly increases the time needed to shop 
fora. Thus, in an almost perverse way, the Maryland courts' refusal 
to change likely complicates the task of Maryland lawyers and 
increases the cost of the services they render to Maryland clients, 
rather than simplifying the lawyers' task and making the rendition 
of their services cheaper to Maryland clients. 
Formal adherence to the requirements of the First Restatement 
imposes other costs as well. The First Restatement leads to unjust 
results in many "false conflicts" cases, or those where only one 
state's legislative interest would be advanced by application of its 
rule, and the issue is beyond the legitimate legislative concern of the 
other state.246 The easiest examples to identify involve the guest-host 
245. See supra note 5. 
246. Brainerd Currie is the leading proponent of the "false conflict" doctrine, 
asserting that when one occurs, all states should agree that the law which 
should apply is that of the only state whose policy interests would be advanced 
through application of its law. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note I, at 107, 110. 
A wide variety of writers agree with him. See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE 
OF LAW PROCESS 82-89 (1965); Arthur T. von Mehren, Book Review, 17 J. 
LEGAL ED. 91, 92 (1964) (reviewing BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
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immunity cases. There were a lot of things wrong with Sacra v. 
Sacra, 247 but the chief error was the view that Delaware had a 
legitimate interest in preventing the recovery simply because some of 
the facts transpired there; in truth, on the facts of that case, only 
Maryland was legitimately concerned with who should recover and 
who should not. Everyone of the Maryland guest-host cases, from 
White v. King248 onward,249 applied the law of the "place of the 
wrong," rather than the law of the state that was the common 
domicile of the parties, the state where their relationship was rooted, 
and the state where the car involved was garaged and insured. The 
argument that prevailed in Babcock v. Jackson2SO-that the only state 
whose policy interests were seriously implicated was the state where 
the parties came from, where their relationship had its seat, and 
where the principal risk of insurance was centered-is based on a 
clear-headed analysis of the purposes with which guest immunity 
statutes are drafted and the reasons why they have been rejected. 
Babcock, hailed by both Brainerd Currie2s1 and Willis Reese,2S2 the 
leading proponent of the Second Restatement, as an excellent example 
of the brand of conflicts jurisprudence each was advocating, came 
out right; the Maryland cases were wrong. 
The guest-host immunity cases are not the only Maryland cases 
that have been wrongly decided in recent years. False conflicts cases 
abound in Maryland jurisprudence. There was no reason for Maryland 
to apply its statute of limitations in such a way as to entertain Johnson 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 253 an Illinois tort claim by Illinois claimants 
against an Illinois defendant, when the action would have been time-
barred under the law of the state from which the case originated.2S4 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963». Even followers of the Second Restatement 
concede its utility as a concept. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 7, at 17-
18. 
247. 48 Md. App. 163, 426 A.2d 7 (1981) (discussed supra notes 79-89 and 
accompanying text). 
248. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). 
249. In addition to Sacra, the cases include Brady v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co., 254 Md. 598, 255 A.2d 427 (1969); Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 
271 (1968); and Earl v. Anchor Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 246 Md. 653, 229 A.2d 
412 (1967). 
250. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
251. See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict 0/ 
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1235 (1963). 
252. [d. at 1253. 
253. 314 Md. 521, 552 A.2d 29 (1989) (discussed supra note 40). 
254. A court applying interest analysis would certainly not have entertained Johnson. 
See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1973). As originally 
promulgated in 1971, § 142 of the Second Restatement characterized statutes 
of limitations as procedural and required a forum reference, but the section 
was revised in 1986 to reach the same result as that reached in cases like 
Heavner. 
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There was no reason in Harrison v. Prentice2SS for Maryland to give 
the estranged British husband of a deceased British wife land situated 
in Maryland, when the state concerned with the distribution of her 
estate and the protection of her spouse would have cut him off clean. 
There was no reason, in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Porter 
Hayden Co. ,2S6 to validate and enforce an insurance contract that 
insured against Maryland risks simply because the contract was 
brokered in New York. The fact is that from its inception, the 
territorialist regime of the First Restatement has repeatedly forced 
courts in Maryland to refuse to apply the law of the state with the 
most significant contacts with the case,2S7 thus inducing the wrong 
result.2S8 
Of course, not all cases are "false conflicts;" not all can be 
resolved correctly as easily as the cases just discussed. But there are 
255. 183 Md. 474, 38 A.2d 101 (1944) (discussed supra notes 26, 200). Professor 
Weintraub has thoroughly analyzed and severely criticized the blanket appli-
cation of the situs rule in real estate cases in his Commentary on the Conflict 
a/Laws. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 185, §§ 8.1-8.22. He believes that under 
his "functional analysis"-a modernized variant of Currie's interest analysis-
the situs rule should frequently give way, and suggests that there is evidence 
in recent cases of this trend. Id. § 8.21A. As he points out, the Second 
Restatement refers almost all issues regarding land to the law of the situs, 
although it does suggest that "situs courts 'might' apply the law of the marital 
domicile in determining marital property rights and explains that they 'might 
do so for the reason that [the marital domicile] is the state which has the 
dominant interest in the parties.'" Id. § 8.21A n.2 (quoting SECOND RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 2, § 233 cmt. b). Thus, there is a bare possibility that a 
Second Restatement court might not follow the situs rule of Harrison. 
256. 97 Md. App. 442, 630 A.2d 261, cert. granted, 333 Md. 201, 634 A.2d 62 
(1993) (discussed supra notes 159-63). 
257. In addition to the guest-host cases and Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter 
Hayden Co., see, for example, Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp. 671 (D. 
Md. 1967). In Debbis, Judge Kaufman considered a wrongful death claim 
involving the death of a Maryland resident against the Hertz COI:poration, a 
national corporation authorized to do business in Maryland, after plaintiff's 
decedent was killed in West Virginia by a negligently maintained Hertz vehicle 
leased to Virginia drivers in Virginia. West Virginia law regarding recovery of 
damages for wrongful death was considerably less generous than was Mary-
land's, but Judge Kaufman concluded that under White v. King he was bound 
to apply the West Virginia rule. Judge Kaufman noted that the then-current 
draft of the Second Restatement, which, like the final version, required 
application of the law of the state with the most significant relationship with 
the transaction and the parties, would probably mandate application of Mar-
yland law, but specifically found that White foreclosed consideration of the 
Second Restatement and instead required application of lex loci delicti. See 
Debbis, 269 F. Supp. at 674-75. 
258. See supra notes 245-55 and accompanying text. At the very least, the results 
in these Maryland cases are inconsistent with what interest analysis or a liberal 
reading of the Second Restatement would require. 
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ways of resolving many conflict-of-Iaws problems in a completely 
above-board, rational way, and courts have gone a long way since 
the days of Brainerd Currie and the drafting of the Second Restate-
ment in demonstrating how this can be accomplished. 2S9 
It has been pointed out that most of the states that rejected the 
First Restatement's lex loci . delicti rule did so when confronted with 
cases where application of the doctrine entailed reaching an unjust 
result, such as application of a guest statute, intrafamily immunity, 
damage limitations in wrongful death cases, or other anachronistic 
tort rules applied in such a way as to needlessly harm forum resi-
dents.260 Maryland's White v. King line of cases261 are exceptions to 
this trend; when faced with a hard decision, Maryland's courts held 
onto bad law. 262 Times have now changed, and there is no need to 
continue to ignore results. Maryland courts should now move on, 
abandoning at long last lex loci delicti and the First Restatement. 
There is now a reasonably consistent doctrine abroad to which 
Maryland courts could look in developing a new approach to conflicts 
problems. This would clarify the inconsistencies in recent Maryland 
case law and lead, in the long run, to a more stable and predictable 
set of rules that would facilitate the accessibility of the legal system 
to people here, the protection of Maryland interests where Maryland 
policies need enforcement,. and a more uniform treatment of cases 
in courts here and in other states. It would also go a long way 
toward eliminating the dysfunctional tendencies of territorialist rules 
that ignore. the underlying policies of states whose interests are at 
stake in conflicts problems, making Maryland cases not only more 
predictable and certain, but also, most importantly, more just. 
259. See supra notes 236-37. 
260. See BORCHERS, supra note 6, at 380-81. 
261. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text. 
262. As indicated in the text, most of the states that changed from the First 
Restatement to another system did so when the alternative choice of adhering 
to it would lead to unjust results, needlessly robbing local citizens of rights 
they would have had under local law. Indeed, aside from the White v. King 
line of cases in Maryland, since 1963, Virginia is the only state whose highest 
court has rigidly adhered to the First Restatement at the cost of substantial 
justice. See McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662 (Va. 1979) (holding that a 
Virginia wife was foreclosed from recovery for injuries sustained in a Tennessee 
auto accident in which her husband was the driver because of a Tennessee 
interspousal immunity doctrine). More commonly, when states are faced with 
such hard choices they have employed one or more escape devices. See, e.g., 
Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986) (public policy used to 
avoid intrafamily immunity doctrine of accident state); Haumschild v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959) (majority uses characterization; 
concurrence uses renvoi to escape interspousal immunity doctrine of accident 
state). 
